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strategy to establish an internal control system throughout the Ukrainian government 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The objective of this project is to review the best practices of American 
organizations in the areas of internal control and fraud prevention and to provide 
guidelines for fraud detection and fraud deterrence for commanders in the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces. This chapter covers the background, purpose of this project, research 
objectives and methodology, definitions, and organization of this report.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Challenges that Increase the Risk of Fraud in the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces 
Although internal control concepts and regulations are used against fraud in 
modern practice, leaders and managers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces face several 
challenges that increase the risk of fraudulent activity.  
a. Decentralization of Management 
Historically, the Ukrainian Armed Forces combined an inherited highly 
centralized system of military control with a decentralized system of economic 
management for the same entity—the military unit. 
On one hand, the military chain of command customarily assumes that 
directives from a central command will be followed rigorously without deviation. 
Sometimes this rigidity introduces absurd situations, such as when a unit’s commander 
cannot make decisions in his area of responsibility without special approval from 
someone in the upper ranks. He becomes indecisive and is undermined as a leader. In 
addition, granting approval demands a lot of time and energy from higher command, so 
the efficiency of the process suffers greatly.  
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On the other hand, since World War II, every military unit in Ukraine has 
its own materiel base. A typical organization (or unit) is accountable for its own 
buildings, depots, and other permanent assets. Every unit has its own supply system 
(actually a mix of centralized supply and local purchasing from domestic producers) and 
separate accounts for all supply categories, from food and gas to armaments. A military 
unit not only has its own budget, but also its own banking accounts, and pays for all its 
expenses. Thus, a Ukrainian unit is a self-sufficient organization comparable in its 
economic functions to a business.  
The military effectiveness of this centralized/decentralized structure may 
be questioned because of its lack of flexibility and the large number of noncombatant 
military personnel performing managerial functions. To improve the economic 
management of the military unit, managerial control offers significant advantages. A 
commander can have the authority to make his managerial decisions in response to the 
local environment, resulting in more flexibility and less time wasted waiting for 
directives from a central authority. The quality of local managerial decisions depends 
heavily on the knowledge and moral character of the commander.  
The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ current system of control cannot be equally 
effective for highly centralized military relations and for decentralized economic relations 
inside the unit. Military units need more guidance which can be transformed into an 
internal commander’s decisions, rather than Ministry directives.  
b. Complexity of Environment 
Complexity negatively impacts accountability and transparency. Today’s 
Ukrainian military operates in an environment of unprecedented complexity. Ukraine is 
creating a new, interoperable armed forces by transforming the old Soviet-era military 
organization. Such transformational periods create extra complexity. For example, there 
are currently two simultaneous accounting systems for financial management, one based 
on old regulations and the other based on modern principles. Theoretically, a dual 
accounting system should insure the whole financial structure against glitches in the new 
accounting system, which needs testing and tuning before being incorporated. However, 
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maintaining two separate accounting systems has created unintended consequences. The 
internal and external consumers of accounting information rely on different sets of 
unconnected books, thus creating an opportunity for intentional misrepresentation of 
factual transactions in either of the systems while also doubling the auditor’s scope of 
work.  
C. PURPOSE OF THIS PROJECT  
The military management (control) is a distinctive realm, far different from the 
civilian business world. The knowledge behind effective command of the battlefield has 
nothing in common with economics. These fields of expertise are as far removed as 
destruction from creation.  
Effective leadership has a different meaning than management. The typical officer 
can inspire and motivate people for combat, but has a weak knowledge of accounting, 
contracting, and supply management, and needs assistance to fight financial fraud. 
Director of Financial Department of Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Ivan Marko claimed 
that a poor understanding of financial principles and the lack of control within the 
military units are the biggest source of fraud in the Ukrainian ministry of defense. 
(Outlines of director’s speech, 2008).  
In May 2008, the director of finances for the Ukrainian Ministry Of Defense 
stated that total losses from fraudulent activity in 2006–2007 had climbed to $600,0001 . 
Seventy-eight percent of that total involved cash-related frauds, and other fraudulent 
activities totaling $200,0002 were not discovered by external auditors for several years 
(Outlines of director’s speech, 2008). The greatest area of concern was fraud that 
involved the financial comptrollers of military units and stemmed from both a lack of 
internal controls and irresponsible practices among commander executives. The absence 
of internal control in military units or organizations often stems from the lack of clear, 
concrete guidance on how to establish controls. 
Providing commanders with practical guidance, as this project attempts to do, 
should not only assist in the understanding of internal controls and fraud prevention but 
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also provide reliable tools for fraud detection and fraud-risk assessment, based on the 
experience of American organizations that are fighting fraud. 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
This project is focused on the following research objectives: 
• To identify individual, organizational, and societal factors that can 
cause a fraud;  
• To organize the factors into early-warning systems that can be used 
to detect and deter fraud. 
• To develop a guide to assist military commanders in detecting and 
deterring fraud. 
This project is applied research3. The main method for this research is deductive 
reasoning from extensive review of fraud-related literature. 
E. DEFINITIONS 
1. Fraud and Internal Control Defined 
Fraud has been an ongoing issue for thousands of years and continues to be a 
problem today. There are several definitions for fraud as a legal (or criminal) concept. 
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, fraud is “the deliberate misrepresentation of 
fact for the purpose of depriving someone of a valuable possession. Although fraud is 
sometimes a crime in itself, more often it is an element of crimes such as obtaining 
money by false pretense or by impersonation” (Britannica, 2009). To understand the 
components of fraud, a systematic approach is in order. As a system, fraud involves 
victims and perpetrators, and as a structure, it involves a fraud scheme. Fraud can be 
evaluated as an open system4, and the challenge is to evaluate the weaknesses of this 
system in order to impact it (detect, prevent, or deter). One of the most effective systems 
for deterring fraud is internal control.  
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Internal control is a system by definition, operating in the same environment as 
the fraud itself and serving as an effective, formidable adversary to the fraud scheme. The 
usual definitions of internal control, described as a process, framework, or function, do 
not touch upon systematic concepts (as discussed in Chapter II). The most widely used 
definition is that of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO): 
a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and 
other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
Reliability of financial reporting. 
Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  
(Internal Control —Integrated Framework, 1992, p.13). 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT 
This MBA project is composed of six chapters. Chapter I discusses the 
background, purpose of this project,   research objectives and methodology, definitions, 
and organization of the report. Chapter II contains a literature review and describes 
modern fraud management and internal control practices, summarizing United States 
anti-fraud regulations and the experience of American corporations in combating fraud. 
Chapter II also describes the author’s vision of the application of the COSO internal 
control framework to military organizations and uncovers challenges in managing 
procurement fraud. Chapter III focuses on the control system of the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Defense, which is based on the effective audit network that oversees the financial activity 
of organizations. Chapter IV analyses the importance of changing leadership styles to 
inspire transformational changes in Ukrainian Armed Forces. In addition, this chapter 
shows the benefits of implementing a fraud-management system at the organizational 
level. Chapter V will provide a sample guide, which, upon approval by the Ukrainian 
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Ministry of Defense, can be distributed to military commanders for practical application. 
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the project, draws conclusions, and recommends 
improvements.  









II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of internal control has developed over time within the United States 
federal government and American corporations. This chapter provides a theoretical basis 
on which to establish solutions for practical internal control problems. A review of the 
literature reveals three major observations concerning successful American models.  
First, over the last decades, federal agencies have been the subject of significant 
internal control discussions and legislation. The “Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-123 of 1981,” the “Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982” 
(FMFIA), the GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and 
DoD directives 5010.38 and 5010.40 serve as consistent guidelines.  
Second, the modern governmental approach to internal control closely parallels 
developments in the private sector. Private-sector regulations in the twentieth century 
were poorly developed; however, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created a general 
framework to reduce that deficiency for the biggest market players - publicly traded 
companies. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO), formed in 1985, is a voluntary private-sector organization devoted to providing 
guidance for establishing effective, efficient, and ethical business practices globally. The 
COSO Internal Control—Integrated Framework (COSO ICIF) became the bible of 
internal control and was adopted by government agencies in later revisions of OMB 
Circular A-123, GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, as well 
as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditing Standard Nos. 2 and 5. 
Third, criminological approaches to fraud allow for a new understanding and for 
new perspectives on fraudulent activities and the relationship to internal control. The 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued Statement on 
Auditing Standards [SAS] No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit which puts into practice standards for all auditors related to detecting fraud. Several 
risk factors recognized as related to fraudulent activities are adopted from criminological 
theories.  
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This chapter will discuss internal control basics and several federal legislation that 
has taken place over the years related to internal control, In addition, the COSO Internal 
Control framework and fraud management will be reviewed. 
B. INTERNAL CONTROL 101 
Internal controls for accounting involve a system of checks and balances to 
prevent loss of any kind, whether due to fraud, waste, poor supervision, or errors. 
Organizations historically define internal control differently depending on their 
objectives. O. Ray Whittington and Kurt Pany, professors and CPAs, observe that 
meaning and objectives of internal control are still changing. If in the 1990’s,  people 
were concerned about fraud prevention as a primary internal control objective, now more 
people believe that internal control is equally important for fraud deterrence and for 
assuring control over operations and other processes.(Whittington & Pany, 2008) 
One of the first official definitions of internal control given by the American 
Institute of Accountants in 1949 is as follows: 
Internal control comprises the plan of organizing and all of the co-ordinate 
methods and measures adopted within a business to safeguard its assets, 
check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote 
operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial 
policies” (Cadmus, 1953, p. 4) 
A detailed definition of internal control was expressed by the AICPA Auditing 
Standards Board in SAS No. 112 in 2006: 
Internal control is a process—effected by those charged with governance, 
management, and other personnel—designed to provide reasonable 
assurance about the achievement of the entity's objectives with regard to 
reliability of financial reporting, effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Internal 
control over the safeguarding of assets against unauthorized acquisition, 
use, or disposition may include controls related to financial reporting and 
operations objectives. Generally, controls that are relevant to an audit of 
financial statements are those that pertain to the entity's objective of 
reliable financial reporting. In this section, the term financial reporting 
relates to the preparation of reliable financial statements that are fairly 
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. 
The design and formality of an entity's internal control will vary 
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depending on the entity's size, the industry in which it operates its culture, 
and management's philosophy. (AU Section 325, 325.03) 
There are other definitions and models as well. For example, the Encyclopedia of 
Business and Finance suggests several modern internal control models. The Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Guidance on Control offers the model named 
Criteria of Control (CoCo). CoCo describes internal control as actions focused on 
• effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
• reliability of internal and external reporting 
• compliance with applicable laws and regulations and internal policies 
The CoCo model combines four elements of internal control: 
• purpose (the objective to be achieved by the task) 
• capability (information, resources, supplies, and skills) 
• commitment 
• monitoring and learning (monitoring task performance to improve the 
process) 
The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation issued Systems 
Auditability and Control (SAC) which defines internal control as “a set of processes, 
functions, activities, subsystems, and people who are grouped together or consciously 
segregated to ensure the effective achievement of objective and goals” (that is, of internal 
control systems) (Internal Control Systems, 2009, p.2).   
All these definitions address objectives for internal control, processes, and the 
variables that influence processes (functions, subsystems, etc.). The most comprehensive 
definition can be found in the COSO ICIF, which will be discussed in detail and serve as 
a basis for developing a practical internal control guide for military commanders.  
The primary objectives of internal control are fraud management and improving 
the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. All other objectives are combinations or 
derivatives of these. For example, the objective of complying with laws and regulations 
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has fraud prevention or efficiency as its ultimate object. This project focuses on fraud 
prevention alone and does not discuss other considerations.    
The next section contains a brief history of official attempts to exercise internal 
control and traces how theories have been incorporated into procedures. Some early 
documents have purposely been omitted because they are insignificant to modern anti-
fraud measures.  
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION  
The executive branch of the United States oversees the effectiveness and 
efficiency of federal agencies, and as a result, has substantial regulation of these agencies.  
1. OMB Circular A-123 
The Presidential Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in October, 1981 
released Circular A-123,5 “Internal Control Systems.” This circular categorized internal 
control issues for federal agencies, establishing standards in anticipation of FMFIA’s6 
becoming law. In December 1982, following FMFIA enactment, the OMB issued the 
assessment guidelines as required by the act. The OMB’s Guidelines for the Evaluations 
and Improvement of and Reporting on Internal Control Systems in the Federal 
Government detailed a seven-step assessment targeted towards an agency’s mission and 
organizational structure. The comptroller general subsequently issued Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government7 in 1983 (United States Congress, House 
Hearing, 2005). 
In December of 2004, OMB published the most recent revision of Circular A-123, 
updated for the reason of better compliance with the standards under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Congressman Todd Russell Platts, chairman of the Subcommittee on Government 
Management, Finance, and Accountability, Committee on Government Reform, observed 
that revised guidance increases responsibility of governmental agencies’ management 
and better defines the necessary actions that need to be done to ensure effectiveness of  
internal controls (United States Congress, House Hearing, 2005).  
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Government Management, 
Finance, and Accountability, Committee on Government Reform, Jeffrey C. Steinhoff, 
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managing director of financial management and assurance for the GAO, stated that the 
updated version of circular A-123 correctly framed internal control systems not merely as 
an isolated management tool but as an integral part of the cycle of planning, budgeting, 
management, accounting, and auditing. (United States Congress, House Hearing, 2005). 
The most significant features of revised OMB Circular A-123 are found in the 
Table 1. 
Content Section 
1. Fostered compliance with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 
(Appendix A, Chapter I) 
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act served as an 
“impetus for the federal government to reevaluate its 
current policies relating to internal control over 
financial reporting and management’s related 
responsibilities” (OMB Circular A-123, 2004, p.20). 
 
  
2. Adopted COSO framework  
(Chapter II) 
The objectives of internal control are:  
• effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations,  
• reliability of financial reporting  
• compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations.  
“Management is responsible for developing and 
maintaining internal control activities that comply 
with the following standards to meet the above 
objectives:  
• control environment 
• risk assessment 
• control activities  
• information and communications 
monitoring” (OMB Circular A-123, 2004, p.7).  
 
3. Based definitions of control deficiency, 
reportable condition, and material 
weakness relative to financial reporting 
upon the definitions provided in “Auditing 
Standard No. 2” issued by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board 
“A control deficiency exists when the design or 
operation of a control does not allow management or 
employees, in the normal course of performing their 
assigned functions, to prevent or detect 
misstatements on a timely basis. A design deficiency 
exists when a control necessary to meet the control 
objective is missing or an existing control is not 
properly designed, so that even if the control 
operates as designed the control objective is not 
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(PCAOB).  
(Appendix A, Chapter II, D)  
always met. An operation deficiency exists when a 
properly designed control does not operate as 
designed or when the person performing the control 
is not qualified or properly skilled to perform the 
control effectively.” (OMB Circular A-123, 2004, 
p.23).  
 
4. Defined algorithm for assessing internal 
control system: 
 
Proper usage of sources of information 
(Chapter IV, A) “Management has primary responsibility for assessing and monitoring controls, and should use 
other sources as a supplement to—not a replacement 
for—its own judgment” (OMB Circular A-123, 
2004, p.13). 
 
Identification of deficiencies 
(Chapter IV, B) “Agency managers and employees should identify deficiencies in internal control from the sources of 
information described above and the results of their 
assessment process” (OMB Circular A-123, 2004, 
p.14).  
Reporting on internal control  
(Chapter VI, A) “Assurance statement should include the annual assurance statements, summary of material 
weaknesses and non-conformances, and summary of 
corrective action plans.”  (OMB Circular A-123, 
2004, p.17). 
Correcting internal control deficiencies 
(Chapter V) 
“Agency managers are responsible for taking timely 
and effective action to correct deficiencies identified 
by the variety of sources” (OMB Circular A-123, 
2004, p.15). 
Table 1.   Features of OMB Circular A-123 in revision December 2004 
In summary, OMB Circular A-123 is the most substantial governmental document 
regulating internal control issues. Because it adopts the broadest perspectives, concepts, 
and procedures from legislation and corporate regulation, OMB Circular A-123 will be 
used as the primary source for a practical guide for military commanders for detecting 
and deterring procurement fraud in Ukrainian military units. 
 13
2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted in response to accounting 
scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s to revive investment activity and ensure 
soundness of financial reports of publicly traded corporations. Enacted on July 30, 2002, 
SOX focuses on improving quality, reliability, and transparency in financial reporting, 
independent audits, and accounting services for all companies regulated by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
By this act, Congress required that: 
Each annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal 
control report, which shall—(1) state the responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an assessment, as of the 
end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the 
internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, sec 404a) 
With respect to the internal control assessment required by subsection (a), 
each registered public-accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit 
report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by 
the management of the issuer. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, sec 404b) 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains eleven titles with specific requirements for 
financial reporting that establish various deadlines for compliance, reporting 
requirements, and standards for integrating auditing and accounting. The Act also 
established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the 
accounting profession. This five-member board, under the authority of the SEC, has the 
responsibility of establishing or adopting auditing, attestation, quality control, ethics, and 
independence standards in the preparation of audit reports for SEC registrants, which are 
publicly-traded companies in the United States. (Whittington & Pany, 2008) 
3. DoD Directive 5010.38; Management Control Program  
In August 26, 1996, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a current update of 
Directive 5010.38, the Management Control (MC) program, to establish policy and 
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assign responsibilities (DoD 5010.38, 1996) for implementing the requirements of OMB 
Circular A-123. The current directive applies throughout the DoD, including the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), military departments, and defense agencies including 
field activities, which are collectively referred to as DoD components (DoD 5010.38, 
1996, p.1). 
Current policy, under DoD directive 5010.38, mandates that each DoD component 
design and implement comprehensive strategies for internal controls that provide 
reasonable assurance in several areas. Specifically, this policy requires: 
• integration of the MC program into daily practices 
• prevention of waste, fraud, and mismanagement, as well as timely 
correction of MC weaknesses 
• continual monitoring and improvement of MC effectiveness 
• reliance on different sources of information 
• management involvement at all levels 
• assigning and training of MC managers (focusing on obligations and 
responsibilities) 
In addition, this directive assigns general responsibility to top DoD management, 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). In summary, Directive 
5010.38 establishes a framework and direction for in-depth development of MC 
programs.   
4. DoD Instruction 5010.40: Managers’ Internal Control Program 
Procedures 
The DoD issued Instruction 5010.40, Management Control [MC] Program 
Procedures, on August 28, 1996. On January 4, 2006, the directive was updated (at the 
same time as the instruction of 1996 was canceled) and the name changed to Managers’ 
Internal Control [MIC] Program Procedures. 
DoD Instruction 5010.40 emphasizes the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity 
Act (FMFIA), as implemented through the DoD Managers’ Internal-Control Program, 
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that requires all DoD managers “to review, assess, and report on the effectiveness of 
internal controls (ICs) within the Department of Defense” (DoD 5010.40, 2006). In 
addition, the instruction requires that the head of each DoD component assigns direct IC 
responsibility to civilian and military leaders and provides trained personnel for planning, 
directing, and implementing the MIC program (DoD 5010.40, 2006). 
This instruction cites twenty-three references designed to implement Federal 
Managers’ Financial Integrity Act and OMB Circular A-123 changes. Generally, 
Instruction 5010.40 is the DoD adaptation of the last version of OMB Circular A-123 and 
contains most of the regulations found in the OMB circular. This instruction is useful for 
the present project because its concise organization and style tend to be user-friendly to 
military persons, providing easy reference to exact points and issues.  
For example,  OMB Circular A-123 describes management’s process for 
resolution and corrective action in general, vague terms such as “assure that performance 
appraisals of appropriate officials reflect effectiveness in resolving or implementing 
corrective action for identified material weaknesses.” DoD Instruction 5010.40 for the 
same action defines a six-point procedure that contains clear, specific statements such as 
“require corrective action plans that show progress on a quarterly basis at a minimum,” or 
“the last milestone in each corrective action plan shall include a correction validation 
unless a metric is used, in which case, the final corrective action shall describe how the 
metric goal was met.” A shortcoming of this document, however, is that it assumes the 
military manager has already received thorough training and has background knowledge 
in implementing of financial control elements.   
To summarize, the purpose of DoD Instruction 5010.40 is to implement the 
Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act and OMB Circular A-123 changes. It contains 
concepts from the most significant sources, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
that increase management’s responsibility over internal control, and from the COSO 
ICIF.  
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D. THE COSO INTERNAL CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
1. History  
The COSO ICIF was prepared in response to recommendations by the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. The commission, commonly referred to 
as the Treadway Commission, was a private-sector initiative jointly sponsored by five 
professional organizations: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
American Accounting Association (AAA), Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), Institute 
of Management Accountants (IMA), and Financial Executives Institute (FEI). 
In 1987, the commission recommended that the sponsoring organizations develop 
additional integrated guidance on internal control. The COSO was formed to support the 
implementation of the Treadway Commission’s recommendations and published the 
completed ICIF in 1993. (Karl Nagel & Company, LLCs Sarbanes-Oxley, 2009). 
2. Definitions  
Precise definitions are probably the most significant achievement of the COSO 
ICIF. 
The first main definition is for internal control:  
Internal control is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following 
categories: 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
• Reliability of financial reporting. 
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  
(COSO ICIF, 1994, p.13) 
This definition enables different approaches for the development of any kind of 
internal control system. The following elements are defined broadly: 
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Process: An internal control system is dynamic and cannot be treated as a one-
time event or circumstance. 
People: Internal control is the effect of people’s decisions and actions, which in 
turn affect other people. People’s understanding, communication, and performance are 
key issues in system functionality. It is a central element of the system. 
Objectives: All control objectives fall into three categories: effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with laws and 
regulations. These categories are distinct but overlapping. A particular objective can 
belong to more than one category; for example, fraud prevention involves all three. The 
strategies an entity employs may approach objectives discretely or address them all 
simultaneously. 
Limitation of activity: Internal controls can provide only reasonable assurance, 
not absolute assurance, and, therefore, need to be combined with other types of control. 
This inherent limitation stems from the inevitability of errors, mistakes, 
miscommunication, and the possibility of overriding system rules. 
The second main definition is of the components of internal control. Internal 
control consists of five interrelated components. These are derived from the way 
management runs a business and are integrated with the management process. The 
components are defined as: 
• Control environment: The core of any business is its people—their 
individual attributes, including integrity, ethical values and competence—
and the environment in which they operate. They are the engine that drives 
the entity and the foundation on which everything rests. 
• Risk assessment: The entity must be aware of and deal with the 
risks it faces. It must set objectives, integrated with the sales, production, 
marketing, financial and other activities so that the organization is 
operating in concert. It also must establish mechanisms to identify, 
analyze and manage the related risks.  
• Control activities: Control policies and procedures must be 
established and executed to help ensure that the actions identified by 
management as necessary to address risks to achievement of the entity’s 
objectives are effectively carried out. 
 18
• Information and communication: Surrounding these activities are 
information and communication systems. These enable the entity’s people 
to capture and exchange the information needed to conduct, manage, and 
control its operations. 
• Monitoring; The entire process must be monitored, and 
modifications made as necessary. In this way, the system can react 
dynamically, changing as conditions warrant. (COSO ICIF, 1994, p.16) 
The COSO components of internal control can be used as bricks for building any 
kind of internal control system by augmenting or cutting functions and processes. The 
following section will discuss these components in more detail. 
3. Internal Control Components  
The COSO model is depicted as a pyramid, with the control environment 
providing a base for risk assessment, control activities, and monitoring. Information and 
communication link the different levels of the pyramid.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Internal Control Components from COSO ICIF, 1994 
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a. Control Environment 
As the base of the pyramid, the control environment sets the tone for the 
organization. Factors of the control environment include “the integrity, ethical values, 
and competence of the entity’s people; management’s philosophy and operating style; the 
way management assigns authority and responsibility and organizes and develops its 
people; and the attention and direction provided by the board of directors” (COSO ICIF, 
1994, p. 23). The control environment provides discipline and structure for the whole 
system. 
The control environment should reflect several factors. First, the 
organization should display strong ethical values. This is difficult because various parties 
have different concerns, incentives, and temptations. Next, all parties should be 
competent in the performance of their duties. Another important factor that significantly 
affects the control environment is management’s philosophy and operating style. 
Furthermore, human-resource policy, including proper assignment of authority and 
responsibility, adequate training, and promotion and compensation guidelines, greatly 
influences the control environment. Finally, the appropriate organizational structure 
enhances the control environment. An organizational structure that is inappropriate for 
the organization’s tasks that causes bottlenecks in information flow, and results in unclear 
assignment of responsibility prevent the accomplishment of organizational objectives. 
(COSO ICIF, 1994) 
b. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment denotes the identification, analysis, and management of 
uncertainties facing an organization from external and internal sources. Risk assessment 
is highly relevant to control objectives. Because internal control is a dynamic system 
(economic and operating conditions are continuously changing), mechanisms of risk 
assessment are also subject to changes and adjustments. Proper setting of objectives is a 
necessary precondition to effective risk assessment. 
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Risk assessment looks at both internal and external threats. Rapid growth, 
changes in personnel or operational processes, new information systems, legislation, or 
technology, and competition all require adequate control measures. Other considerations 
outlined in the COSO report include the techniques used in identifying risk such as 
forecasting, planning, deriving results from internal and external auditor experience, 
economic reviews, and quantitative and qualitative prioritization. In addition, assessment 
includes analyzing risks, estimating the significance of a risk and the possibility of it 
occurring, and considering what action to take in response. Finally, mechanisms used in 
assessing risk should be flexible and fit the dynamic environment. (COSO ICIF, 1994) 
c. Control Activities 
Control activities include the policies and procedures maintained by an 
organization to ensure management directives are carried out. They include a range of 
activities such as “approvals, authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, reviews of 
operating performance, security of assets, and segregation of duties” (COSO ICIF, p. 49). 
Control activities are the most visible element of internal control and arguably the most 
important in preventing wrong actions from occurring. However, the COSO suggests that 
the control environment is more critical because it influences motivation for proper 
behavior. 
Control activities can be easily established and should be considered 
startup elements for developing the internal control system of a new organization. The 
COSO identifies six categories of control activities. These categories include segregation 
of duties, physical controls over cash and other assets, top-level reviews of performance, 
effective direct management of activities, information processing of transactions, 
restriction of access to data, investigation of unusual performance indicators, and 
maintenance of proper documentation of transactions. In addition, the COSO dedicates an 
entire section to categories specifically related to control activities for information 
systems, such as data centers, system-software acquisition and maintenance, and access 
security.  
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d. Information and Communication 
Information and communication concerns include the identification, 
capture, and exchange of financial, operational, and compliance-related data in a timely 
manner. People within an organization who have timely, reliable, and understandable 
information are better able to conduct, manage, and control operations. 
Information and communication stress the quality of information. 
Information should be appropriate, timely, current, accurate, and accessible. All these 
elements are extremely important and must be applied by the internal control system 
design; otherwise, the components of the internal control system will be unable to operate 
as a whole. Information is identified, captured, processed, and reported by information 
systems.  
Information systems can be formal or informal, can operate in routine-
monitoring mode or on call, and can be integral part of every activity, whether strategic 
planning, operations, or control.  
The COSO stated that communication is inherent to information systems8 
and can be internal or external. 
Effective communication also must occur in a broader sense, flowing 
down, across and up the organization. All personnel… must understand 
their own role in the internal control system, as well as how individual 
activities relate to the work of others. …There also needs to be effective 
communication with external parties, such as customers, suppliers, 
regulators and shareholders. (COSO ICIF, p.59) 
The COSO also suggests several practical means for effective 
communications, which include policy manuals, memoranda, bulletin-board notices, 
videotaped messages, and the most powerful form of communication, action by 
management in dealing with subordinates.  
e. Monitoring 
Monitoring refers to the assessment of the quality of internal control. 
Monitoring activities provide information about potential and actual breakdowns in a 
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control system. Monitoring can occur through self-assessments, external audits, or 
through direct testing of a control. It is important that any significant deficiencies be 
reported to the individual responsible for the activity as well as to management one level 
higher. 
Monitoring can be done in two ways: through ongoing activities or 
separate evaluations (COSO ICIF, 1994). Ongoing monitoring is performed routinely and 
includes activities which managers perform routinely like comparisons or reconciliations 
(COSO ICIF). In fact, ongoing monitoring creates an effective balancing feedback loop 
for managers’ decisions about internal control.  
Separate evaluations may vary in scope and frequency which are driven by 
risks. The more significant risks are the more important are control activities which 
reduce the risks (COSO ICIF).  
E. FRAUD MANAGEMENT 
Why present fraud management separately from internal control? The answer lies 
in approaching fraud as a system that has its own objectives, processes, communication 
subsystem, and main-elements – perpetrators. From the internal control perspective, fraud 
is a failure of the system. Thus, if fraud prevention can be an objective of effective 
internal control, its detection is a separate activity best explained by sociological or 
criminological approaches. 
1. Fraud 101  
The 2008 “Report to the Nation” issued by the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE) indicated that the typical American organization loses seven percent 
of its annual revenue to fraud. Applied to the gross domestic annual product for 2008, 
that equals approximately $994 billion in total losses (ACFE, 2008). 
Although it is common knowledge that people and corporations commit fraud, 
what is seldom understood is why they do it. Understanding the motive behind fraud is 
important in preventing it. 
 23
There are many definitions of fraud and they are difficult to combine into one 
discrete concept because fraud is multidimensional. Several disciplines, such as 
psychology, sociology, criminology, and business, have described fraud from their own 
perspectives, emphasizing different aspects of the problem. For example, one modern 
fraud definition, suggested by Sridhar Ramamoorti, Certified Public Accountant (CPA), 
Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), Certified Financial 
Services Auditor (CFSA), Certified Risk Professional (CRP), Certified Government 
Auditing Professional (CGAP), and Certified Government Financial Manager (CGFM), 
states:  
Fraud involves intentional acts and is perpetrated by human beings using 
deception, trickery, and cunning that can be broadly classified as 
comprising two types of misrepresentation: suggestio falsi (suggestion of 
falsehood) or suppressio veri (suppression of truth). (Ramamoorti, 2008 
p.1) 
This definition contains elements from business, sociology, and psychology. 
Albrecht, Romney, Cherrington, Payne, and Roe (1982) have examined the 
problem of detecting and preventing business fraud. Two accounting professors, a 
professor of organizational behavior, a professor of psychology, and a prison 
psychologist, respectively, suggest various explanations of the nature of fraud. The most 
significant, from their perspectives, are psychological and sociological explanations. 
2. Psychological Explanation of Fraud 
Historically, psychologists have developed two major theories of crime: the 
psychoanalytic and the learning theory. The most popular psychoanalytic theory states 
that fraud perpetrators are “sick.” According to Sigmund Freud, such sickness can be 
caused by malfunctions in the individual’s development. Fraud can have its origins in a 
person's id, that part of the personality that seeks to satisfying needs and desires. Under 
this model, the perpetrator fails to control the impulses of the id. Another malfunction 
contributing to fraud is found in the action of the underdeveloped conscience, or 
superego. This theory suggests that fraud stems from lack of parental identification and 
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social training. Since the patient’s dishonesty does not create feelings of guilt, he may 
commit fraud whenever there is an opportunity (Albrecht et al., 1982).  
A second psychological explanation of fraud derives from the learning theory, 
which suggests that fraudulent behavior is determined by environmental factors. 
Individuals will do what their environment teaches them to do. If a person is reinforced 
for honesty, he or she will be honest; if for dishonesty, the person will be dishonest. Most 
fraudulent behavior is learned by “operant conditioning, where behavior is influenced by 
the kinds of rewards and punishments that are associated with it” (Albrecht et al., 1982, 
p.32). For example, successfully obtaining extra income or removal of impending debts 
by fraud reinforces fraudulent behavior. Under this theory, “perpetrators become 
involved in crime after being reinforced for some small, illegal act that encourages them 
to do more” (Albrecht et al., 1982, p.32). By this theory, indirect experience is very 
important. Potential perpetrators see others rewarded for successful crimes, increasing the 
probability that they will act in similar behaviors.  
 3. Sociological Explanations of Fraud 
Sociological explanations of fraud are quite similar to the learning theory. 
Albrecht et al., 1982 discusses two of the best-known explanations, Sutherland’s 
“differential association” theory and Cressey’s “nonshareable need” theory. Both theories 
go deeper than learning theory in explaining the motivations of perpetrators. 
In Sutherland’s view, criminal behavior is linked to a criminal environment. The 
primary source for criminal learning is social interactions with individuals having 
criminal tendencies. 
Albrecht et al., 1982 summarized major elements of differential-association 
theory as follows: 
Criminal behavior is learned; it is not inherited, and the person who is not 
already trained in crime does not invent criminal behavior. Criminal 
behavior is learned through interaction with other people, through the 
processes of verbal communication and example. The principle learning of 
criminal behavior occurs with intimate personal groups. The learning of 
crime includes learning the techniques of committing the crime, and the 
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motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes that accompany it. A person 
becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions (or personal 
reactions) favorable to the violation of the law over definitions 
unfavorable to the violation of the law. (Albrecht et al, 1982, p.34) 
Another sociological theory of fraud was suggested by Dr. Donald Cressey, a 
notable teacher and pioneer in fraud research who developed the fraud triangle theory. 
Albrecht et al., 1982 describe the main concepts of Cressey’s “nonshareable need” 
theory. Fraud is a “violation of a position of financial trust” that a person originally took 
in good faith. Trusted persons become trust violators only if the following three elements 
occur: “(1) a nonsharable problem, (2) an opportunity for trust violation, and (3) a set of 
rationalizations that define the behavior as appropriate in a given situation. None of these 
elements alone would be sufficient to result in embezzlement” (Albrecht et al., 1982, 
p.34). 
4. Fraud Triangle 
An important conceptual framework in understanding fraud is the "fraud triangle, 
which is derived from Cressey’s theory, widely disseminated by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, and mirrored in AICPA’s SAS No. 99. The fraud triangle has 
three elements, which include perceived incentives and pressures, perceived 
opportunities, and rationalization of fraudulent behavior (see Figure 2). All three 
elements of the fraud triangle reciprocally influence the fraud perpetrators’ psychology 
and philosophy.  
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Figure 2.   The Fraud Triangle 
a. Incentives/Pressures/Motivation 
There are many motivations for fraud, most related to greed (as a character 
stated in the movie “Wall Street,” “greed is good”). Albrecht et al. (1982) identifies at 
least twenty-five different motivations, including living beyond one’s means, immediate 
financial need, debts, poor credit, a drug or gambling addiction, and family pressure. 
Sometimes a perpetrator commits fraud to help his company improve financial results.  
In addition, Albrecht et al., 1982 discusses emotional (personal 
psychological) motives. Beside greed, sometimes pride (“catch me if you can”), 
impatience, or power play a role. An employee may feel anger and hostility against a 
company or have a “revenge motive” to make the organization pay for perceived 





Albrecht et al., 1982 states that opportunities to commit fraud should be 
assessed from two perspectives: 
• opportunities that individuals create for themselves (for example, 
increasing their knowledge about an organization’s operations, 
advancing to a position of trust, or being the only person who 
knows a sensitive procedure such as modifying computer 
programs) 
• opportunities created by an organization’s poor internal control 
system (opportunity increases under complex business structures, 
liberal accounting practices, or high management turnover) 
Out of the three fraud triangle elements, opportunity is the one where 
fraud prevention can excel. In fact, opportunities for fraud are the same elements that 
occur as deficiencies of internal control system. Effective internal control is absolutely 
critical to deter opportunity in a fraud prevention program. 
c. Rationalization/Integrity 
The third element of the fraud triangle is rationalization. Personal integrity 
and personal code of ethics are key to this fraud element. 
Most researchers, such as W. Steve Albrecht, Chad Albrecht, Conan C. 
Albrecht , and Sridhar Ramammoorti agree that rationalization is a more complex issue 
than mere determination as to whether a person is honest or dishonest. For example, 
Albrecht et al., 2008 refer to modern social decoys, or “role models”—politicians, 
athletes, and movie stars—who are no longer examples of honesty and integrity. 
Moreover, Albrecht et al., 2008 qualify educational failure as a fraud-reasoning factor 
because a large majority of students do not understand ethical dilemmas and “would not 
recognize a fraud if it hit them between the eyes” (Albrecht et al., 2008, p.5). In addition, 
Peter Goldmann 2008, editor and publisher of the monthly newsletter, “White-Collar  
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Crime Fighter” suggests a new, extra rationalization factor: the present mass layoffs 
inducing a feeling of insecurity, isolation, and hopelessness, and erosion of healthcare 
and pension benefits. 
d. The American Dream Theory of Fraud 
An interesting development in the fraud triangle theory is suggested by 
Freddie Choo and Kim Tan of San Francisco State University, 2006. The term "the 
American dream" was introduced into contemporary social analysis in 1931 by historian 
James Truslow Adams to describe his vision of a society open to individual achievement 
(Choo and Tan, 2006).  
An American-dream theory of crime in the United States was introduced 
in 1994 by Stephen F. Messner and Richard Rosenfeld, contemporary criminologists in 
their work, “Crime and the American Dream.” The basic idea of the American-dream 
theory is that “the pursuit of monetary success (i.e., the institution of economy) has come 
to dominate the American society, and that the non-economic institutions (i.e., the 
institution of education, the institution of polity, and the institution of family) have 
tended to become subservient to the economy” (Choo and Tan, 2006, p.208). This theory 
has become an effective complement to the fraud triangle theory. Application of the 
American-dream theory revolves around three key points including “Intense emphasis on 
monetary success, corporate executives exploiting/disregarding regulatory controls, and 
corporate executives justifying/rationalizing fraudulent behavior, which have their 
institutional underpinnings in the capitalist economy of the United States” (Choo and 
Tan, 2006, p.211).. 
The American society is not uniquely materialistic; the same strong 
interest in material well being is found in most European societies. Modern Ukrainian 
society, for example, shares a preoccupation with “success at any cost.” Modern 
blockbusters propagate a “beautiful life.” Media channels show politics “influenced” by 
rich people. Money becomes the measurement for achievement and success. It would be 
difficult to eliminate this pressure-rationalization factor from the fraud triangle.  
 29
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a review of the literature from several types of documents 
related to internal control issues and an explanation of the phenomenon of fraud. It 
discussed internal control basics and several federal legislation as well as the COSO 
Internal Control framework and fraud management. The author concludes that no one 
single theory can adequately explain fraud.  
Some psychological theories focus on factors within the person while other 
theories—for example the learning theory—focus on the environment. Even the most 
advanced fraud triangle theory that effectively combines internal and external factors has 
room for more development. It seems obvious that the blueprint for an anti-fraud program 
should involve the overlapping of all theories.  
The fraud triangle presents the clearest understanding of the major elements of 
fraud, which include incentive, opportunity, and rationalization. Opportunity is the 
weakest link in the fraud triangle because it mostly exploits internal control deficiencies. 
Effective internal control is absolutely critical in a fraud prevention program. 
U.S. legislation is associated with a wide range of documents relating to internal 
control issues. For the purposes of this project, the most significant legislation are Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 (the latest edition) and the COSO 
ICIF. These documents will provide tools for developing the “Commander’s Guide for 
Detecting and Deterring Procurement Fraud in Military Units in the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine.”  
Chapter III discusses the specifics of financial control in the Ukrainian armed 
forces, which explicitly rely on professional, external audit only. 
 
 30
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 31
III. THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONTROL 
SYSTEM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the state of governmental financial control in Ukraine. 
Several concepts of internal control, as previously discussed, are absent in the Ukrainian 
government or have different meanings. The current financial control system of the 
armed forces is an unrefined part of the overall governmental control system of Ukraine, 
which is centralized, expensive, inflexible, and ultimately ineffective. 
The internal control system exhibits a managerial style in which many top-level 
agencies of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have official responsibility, but 
where division of responsibility is vague. This confusion hinders even the beginnings of a 
new control system.  
This chapter discusses the organizational structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces 
and the existing control network. In addition, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Ukrainian control system will be reviewed. 
B. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED 
FORCES  
There is no alternative to creating a modern, combat-effective, highly 
professional armed forces capable of reacting quickly and adequately to all 
present-day challenges. (President and Supreme Commander in Chief 
Victor Yushchenko, White Book 2007, p.3)  
The Ukrainian Armed Forces consist primarily of three main branches: The Land 
Force, Air Force, and Navy.9 Total personnel (including 50,000 civilian workers) at the 
beginning of 2009 were 212,000 (White Book, 2008). The current system of hierarchy 
and control is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   Command and Control Bodies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (from 
White Book 2007)  
1. The Land Force of Ukraine 
The Land Force was formed by presidential decree in 1996, per Article 4 of the 
Law of Ukraine, “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” According to defense doctrine, the 
land force is the main wielder of combat power (Presidential Decree 648/2004). 
From information on the official site of the Ukrainian MoD 
(http://www.mil.gov.ua), the land force consists of mechanized and armored forces, 
rocket troops and artillery, land-force aviation, the airmobile force, and air defense for 
troops. The main command is located in Kyiv.   
2. The Air Force of Ukraine 
The Air Force was created in 1992 by order of the chief of general staff of the 
armed forces. This highly mobile branch is assigned to secure national air space by 
providing full-range air defense, enemy objects assault, landing operations support of 
Ukrainian troops, military airlift, and aerial reconnaissance (Presidential decree 
648/2004). 
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At present, the Air Force consists of five branches: bomber (Tu-22m3 and Su-
24m aircraft), assault (Su-25 aircraft), fighter (Su-27 and Mig-29 aircraft), 
reconnaissance (Su-24mr and Su-17m4r aircraft), and transport (Il-76 and An-24 
aircraft). The main command is in Vinnitsa. 
3. The Ukrainian Navy 
The Navy defends state interests at sea, eliminating enemy threats in its 
operational zone alone or in cooperation with the other military forces (Presidential 
decree 648/2004). The five main branches are surface, submarine, naval aviation, coast 
rocket-artillery, and Marines. The command is headquartered in Sevastopol.  
C. THE EXISTING CONTROL NETWORK  
1. Preamble 
Before discussing the existing control network, it is necessary to clarify the 
definitions of several words with different linguistic and conceptual meanings for 
Ukrainians and Americans.   
The term “financial control” in a Ukrainian context differs from its use in the 
U.S.A. In Ukraine, “control” means “oversight” or “audit.” The difference may appear 
insignificant, but the reality is not. Financial control in Ukraine does not indicate direct 
influence on a controlled activity, but rather, a correction of deficiencies or legal 
violations and the reporting of these problems to management. The main aim of control 
in Ukraine is to detect possible economic crimes, not to exert influence in organizational 
activities. 
“Internal control” in Ukrainian legislation, administrative usage, and applications 
is understood as the equivalent of the American “audit.” It refers to controls that are 
organized within a ministry and does not apply at the entity level. In the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD), for example, internal control is realized by the control and oversight 
department, which organizes and provides most of the audits for the MoD. This 
department has subordinated organizations throughout the services, such as control and 
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oversight offices in Land Force, Air Force, and Navy. Internal control has never played 
an assurance role or been used as a managerial tool.  
The Ukrainian equivalent to the American term “internal control” resembles that 
of “intra-organizational,” ”intra-economic,” or “managerial” control. However, this type 
of control in Ukraine has never been assessed as a financial function or had internal audit 
elements.  
2. The Governmental Financial Control System 
The legislative branch of the Ukrainian parliament (Verhovna Rada) has financial 
control functions through the accounting chamber, which “executes control over revenues 
and expenditures of the state budget of Ukraine on behalf of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine.” (Constitution of Ukraine, art. 98) 
Governmental financial control through the executive branch is a function of the 
Ministry of Finance (MF). The MF has two main control structures that directly execute 
control, and one structure, formerly part of the MF, that is now independent: 
• The “Main Control and Revision Office of Ukraine” (though a  branch of 
the MF, its responsibility  is equivalent of the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget.) 
• The “Tax Administration Office” (equivalent to the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service, but functioning as a separate central governmental entity—a 
ministry) 
• The “State Treasury of Ukraine” (unlike the American treasury, part of the 
Ministry of Finance) 
a. The Main Control and Revision Office of Ukraine 
This office was created under Law of Ukraine “On the Governmental 
Control and Revision service of Ukraine” in 1993. The office has changed from being an 
independent governmental office to a branch of the Ministry of Finance, and back again, 
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several times. Although part of the MF, this office has special privileges and authority 
and an organizational structure that extends territorially over the whole state.  
The main tasks of the Main Control and Revision Office are executing 
control over governmental spending and over financial reporting of ministries, 
governmental enterprises, and organizations using state budget money, and developing 
governmental policy in a field of internal financial control (Law of Ukraine No.2939-XII, 
1993). The office executes governmental financial control through financial audit, 
revision of procurement systems, and inspection of governmental organizations 
(including the armed forces and uniformed services). 
b. State Tax Administration of Ukraine  
The Tax Administration Office bases its activity on the Law of  Ukraine  
On the Governmental Taxation Service in Ukraine, 1990. Like the Main Control and 
Revision Office, this administrative office fluctuated between being a branch of the MF 
and a central governmental office. Now it is a separate ministry. Control responsibilities 
of the office apply to all activities related to taxes, regardless of economic sector or 
ownership of entities. Because of its narrow and specific objectives, tax control activities 
within the office have only a minimal relationship to principles of internal control. The 
office audits military units as well as other organizations to ensure compliance with the 
tax code.  
c. The State Treasury of Ukraine 
The State Treasury of Ukraine oversees the budget in crediting proceeds, 
assuming liabilities, and making payments (Decree of President of Ukraine No. 335, 
1995). According to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1232, 
2005, the treasury carries out budget-related activities in various jurisdictions. They 
perform audit functions to ensure compliance of governmental entities with budget 
legislation. The treasury also controls spending of budget funds while checking 
compliance of underlying spending documents with budget allocations and requirements 
of budget legislation (equivalent of U.S. “color of money”). Finally, the treasury is 
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responsible for insuring compliance of estimates of spending units with the state and 
local budget lists as well as compliance with unified rules of accounting. The treasury 
performs audits of military units and other state and local budget-related organizations. 
d. Perspectives 
  Financial control agencies throughout the government are interested in 
creating effective internal control in organizations as part of assurance services. 
Accordingly, the Main Control and Revision Office has proposed the development of a 
state system of internal financial control.  
This proposal would change the ideology, practice, and theory of financial 
control to conform to the “norms and rules of the European Union (EU) and 
achievements in the legal field in the sphere of state financial control” (Order of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 158-p, 2005). In particular, new concepts would 
provide for the introduction of “new effective forms of control: internal audit and internal 
control” (Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 158-p. 2005).The proposal 
establishes a general framework for developing internal control and divides responsibility 
over the process between governmental offices, laying out a harmonious system of 
internal audit and internal control using the COSO internal control model. 
While this proposal was approved by the cabinet in May 2005, with actual 
creation and installment of the system projected to occur within five years, no significant 
progress has been made due to several difficulties. The first difficulty is the absence of 
basic supportive legislation in the field of internal control. Second, and probably more 
significant, is the lack of experts and well-trained personnel to understand and implement 
internal control concepts. The educational system in Ukraine is not presently equipped to 
produce experts in this discipline because it is a new field that represents a novel 
departure from past practices. The final difficulty is the engrained thinking of old-
fashioned managers who will only consider one form of control--professional inspection-
- and will reject any internal control changes. 
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3. The Financial Control System in the Ministry of Defense  
Financial control in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is a structural part of 
governmental internal financial control.10 The importance of the MoD financial control 
stems from the variety of its subjects and its extended set of regulations. The MoD 
financial control has a highly centralized structure that follows the general MoD 
command and control structure (Figure 3.). 
The main body of the MoD financial control is the Control and Oversight 
Department. At the beginning, this department was a structural part of the department of 
finance. However, in 2001, the MoD decided to separate and expand oversight functions. 
(MoD Directive No. 170, 2001). Because of ambiguities concerning the current legal 
basis for financial control inside the MoD, which contains overlapping directives and 
instructions, in 2002, the ministry tried to divide responsibility over financial control 
between Control and Oversight and other MoD agencies. As a result, MoD Directive No. 
D-5, 2002, established Control and Oversight as having the main responsibility over the 
system of follow-up financial control, which includes audit, inspection, and oversight. 
Intra-economic” (managerial) control over subordinate units became the responsibility of 
all top-level agencies of the MoD (Figure 4.). Therefore, internal control functions are 
dispersed over a wide array of agencies. The Department of Finance assumed 
responsibility for creating a methodology for preventive financial control over the flow of 
transactions, the analysis of performance, and financial reporting.  
The current organization of financial control in the MoD consists of three levels 
according to the structure of command and control in the armed forces (Figure 3). At the 
strategic level of management, Control and Oversight is in charge. At the operational 
level (the level of main military services), two control and oversight directorates of the 
Air Force and Navy, respectively,11 are in place. The army corps, air force commands, 
and naval centers are administered by about fourteen control and oversight branches12. 
The control and oversight services occupy the total of 230 full-time, professional 




Figure 4.   Command-and-Control Central Agencies that Provide Financial Oversight 
in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (from White Book 2007) 
D. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE UKRAINIAN CONTROL 
SYSTEM 
In system dynamics, the phenomenon of “shifting the burden” is well known. This 
phenomenon was described by Peter Michael Senge, an American scientist and director 
of the Center for Organizational Learning at the MIT Sloan School of Management in his 
The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (Senge, 1990).  
In a “shifting the burden” situation, a problem’s symptom can be addressed by 
applying a symptomatic solution or a more fundamental solution. When a symptomatic 
solution is implemented, the problem symptom is reduced or disappears. This decreases 
the pressure for realizing a more fundamental solution. Over time, if a similar symptom  
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arises or recurs, higher level symptomatic solutions are implemented. It is a vicious 
reinforcing cycle. The symptomatic solutions produce side-effects that take away from 
the fundamental solutions. (Senge, 1990) 
The current financial control organization in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is an 
obvious case in which the main “control burden” shifted from organizations to top-level 
management. To respond to increasing fraud within military units during the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, top-level managers instead of training and developing local control 
resources, which is a time-consuming process, augmented the capability of central 
control and oversight agencies. Now, at the top level of the MoD, there are ten agencies 
that provide financial auditing and are directly responsible for the financial results of 
military units (see Figure 4, circled data). The question is whether this is an effective or 
ineffective control structure. 
According to Senge (1990), this system should be ineffective because it treats 
only symptoms, not problems. But the Ukrainian management may argue that the current 
system has many advantages. First, the current system possesses a high level of expertise. 
However, highly professional personnel come at a high cost. The professional education 
of an auditor requires additional time and more resources, which can be quite expensive. 
The cost of a military auditor who is an officer of the armed forces is about $13,00014 
annually, which is 2.5 times more than the average salary of a Ukrainian military officer 
of the same rank. Hiring civilian personnel would be less costly for the armed forces 
organization.   
A second argument for the current system is that it is comprehensive. All auditing 
activity is regulated by directives and instructions that cover almost all possible cases. 
Though all regulations are static and reactive by definition, fraud and internal control are 
dynamic systems. New fraud cases and new control responses often are far different from 
known fraudulent schemes. The reason for that is a continuously changing environment. 
New regulations can only follow these changes. Moreover, the current environment is 
uncertain, primarily because of the financial crisis. Managerial control theory holds that 
uncertainty has powerful repercussions on managerial controls. In uncertain conditions, 
decentralized control is the most stable option. Decentralized control gives people the 
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ability to act without the delay caused by waiting for directives from the top. As a result, 
actions to prevent fraud are more timely, pertinent, and flexible. 
Finally, the financial control community expresses the idea that the existing 
financial control system provides absolute assurance of the absence of fraud because of 
its airtight, overlapping control. In fact, the author’s experience shows the opposite to be 
true because the areas of responsibility among agencies are blurred. For example, the 
military university is subject to financial auditing from the Control and Oversight 
Department (general audit of activity), the Economic and Administrative Activities 
Department (audit of commercial activities), and the Department of Construction (audit 
of construction activities). The Military Education and Science Department takes general 
responsibility for university functions and can also audit financial activities. Auditors 
from different agencies often rely on and refer to information from each other, limiting 
their own scope of work. Within the school itself, the Military Education and Science 
Department issues directives about the results of controls and future developments. If 
fraud is discovered in a past (audited) period, it is impossible to find which auditor 
neglected the case. As John F. Kennedy observed, “victory has a thousand fathers, but 
defeat is an orphan.”  
In summary, the Ukrainian Armed Forces has an intricate, expensive, and 
ultimately unsatisfactory control system. Following Senge’s theory, the solution is to 
Focus on the fundamental solution. If the symptomatic solution is 
imperative (because of delays in fundamental solution), use it to gain time 
while working on the fundamental solution. (Senge, 1990, p. 381) 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the current state of financial control in Ukraine, 
concentrating on specific aspects of the control system as viewed against the 
organizational structure of the armed forces and the historically inherited controls. This 
chapter also discussed the organizational structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the 
existing control network. In addition, the strengths and weaknesses of the Ukrainian 
control system were reviewed. 
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The financial control system of Ukraine in general and that of the armed forces in 
particular do not include internal control as part of a whole, effective system. However, 
the cabinet has directed the implementation of an internal control system for 
governmental agencies by approving a COSO internal control model. 
Chapter IV applies theoretical concepts of internal control and a criminological 
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IV. FROM THE EXTERNAL AUDIT SYSTEM TO THE 
EFFECTIVE INTERNAL CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The need to create internal control systems for Ukrainian military units as official 
government policy is inevitable. As the new system precipitates organizational and 
cultural changes, effective leadership becomes extremely important. This research 
project, culminating in A Practical Guide for Commanders in Detecting and Deterring 
Procurement Fraud in Military Units in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereafter referred 
to as the Commander’s Guide), aims to provide both a solid introduction to internal 
control and guidance in achieving visible, short-term benefits. Because internal control is 
not a panacea against fraud and must be combined with other external and internal 
measures, the Commander’s Guide also informs leaders of the inherent limitations of any 
internal control system.  
This chapter covers the importance of changing leadership strategies to inspire 
transformational changes in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Also, the importance of the 
informational component of an anti-fraud system is discussed in the systemization of 
fraud cases section of this chapter. Finally, the effectiveness and efficiency of internal 
control will be addressed.  
B. CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES AND LEVELS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 
John P. Kotter of the Harvard Business School, widely cited for his research in 
leadership and management, finds that management functions such as planning and 
budgeting, organizing and staffing, controlling and problem-solving are important, but 
not the same as leadership functions such as setting direction, aligning people, and 




moving people in a desired direction by “mostly non-coercive means.” Moreover 
effective leadership moves people in a direction that is “genuinely in their real long-term 
best interests” (Kotter, 1988).      
A feature of effective military organizations is strong leadership, which is about 
creating, inspiring, and initiating change. To create an internal control system in the 
MoD, leaders will have to involve themselves in the constant “live” control of execution 
and performance. This requirement will be contrary to the bureaucratic style of 
management presently practiced by MoD leadership and thus represents a significant 
impediment in implementing internal controls. 
Bureaucracy implies formal processes, standardization, hierarchy of authority, a 
focus on written documents, specialization of functions, fixed rules, non-elective 
government officials, and so on. Bureaucracy was developed to solve problems when the 
work could be done by people who might not have the skills, experience, motivation, or 
training to make wide-ranging decisions, but who could do work that was carefully 
prescribed (McShane, 2007). However, in curtailing a worker’s scope of responsibility 
through rules and procedures, organizations sacrifice flexibility.  
Clearly, the creation of an internal control system is not merely about a new set of 
rules. It means reformation of an organization’s processes, structure, and culture. The 
prime task for leadership is developing a strategy to effect positive change. 
Kotter (1988) introduces several ideas for leading change. His eight-step program, 
listed below, combines elements from different disciplines, namely psychology, 
sociology, economics, and systems thinking.  
1. Establish a sense of urgency. 
• Examine market and competitive realities. 
• Identify and discuss crises, potential crises, or major opportunities. 
2. Form a powerful guiding coalition. 
• Assemble a group with enough power to lead the change effort. 
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• Encourage the group to work together as a team. 
3. Create a vision. 
• Create a vision to help direct the change effort. 
• Develop strategies for achieving that vision. 
4. Communicate the vision. 
• Use every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies. 
• Teach new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition. 
5. Empower others to act on the vision. 
• Get rid of obstacles to change. 
• Change systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision. 
• Encourage risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions. 
6. Plan for and creating short-term wins. 
• Plan for visible performance improvements. 
• Create those improvements. 
• Recognize and reward employees involved in the improvements. 
7. Consolidate improvements and produce still more change. 
• Use increased credibility to change systems, structures, and policies that 
don't fit the vision. 
• Hire, promote, and develop employees who can implement the vision. 
• Reinvigorate the process with the new projects, themes, and change 
agents. 
8. Institutionalize new approaches. 
• Articulate the connections between the new behaviors and corporate 
success. 
 46
• Develop the means to ensure leadership development and succession. 
The first lesson from the most successful transformations in corporate America is 
that the process comprises a series of phases that, in total, usually require a considerable 
amount of time. Skipping steps creates only the illusion of speed, not the long-term 
effects leadership desires. A second lesson is that critical mistakes in any one phase can 
have a devastating impact, slowing momentum, and negating hard-won gains (Kotter, 
1988). 
Devising a change strategy for creating an internal control system in the MoD is 
beyond the limits of this project. The aim is to fit the Commander’s Guide into a general 
strategic framework for creating internal control, not to prescribe the entire process. It is 
hoped that this project will help commanders establish a sense of urgency, grasp a vision 
of the process, and create short-term, visible improvements that will encourage 
improvements to efficiencies already achieved.  
1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
The first step in the transformational process is critical because it requires 
aggressive leadership. Without top-level management creating a sense of urgency, people 
will not help, and the effort will never be successful. Organizational leadership should 
find ways to communicate this urgency and create opportunities to address the critical 
elements that created that sense of urgency. The first task outlined in the Commander’s 
Guide is a thorough evaluation of the current control system. All deficiencies of internal 
control in military units and the consequences of those deficiencies must be exposed to 
create a sense of urgency.  
2. Vision 
A vision statement clarifies the direction in which an organization needs to move 
(Kotter, 1990). Without a clear vision, changes can be confusing or insignificant, and 




in the Commander’s Guide is to create in military leaders a feeling for the overall system 
of internal control—a grasp of its clear, logical structure, processes, objectives, and 
subjects—people. 
3. Creating Short-Term Benefits 
Kotter states that without short-term benefits, too many people give up too soon 
and begin to resist changes. Short-term gains provide tangible evidence that 
transformation is working. Short-term gains are important to the overall strategy because 
when people realize that changes take a significant amount of time, interest decreases. 
Effective leadership means dedicating a great deal of effort to achieving short-term gains 
to keep a high level of urgency and support for the vision. For example, successful 
detection and elimination of discovered fraud should be made highly visible as a short-
term gain. Promoting such benefits is the third main goal of the Commander’s Guide.   
4. Shift in Leadership Strategies 
The entrenched view among Ukrainian leaders—a legacy of Soviet times—is that 
people must be coerced into working because they would never choose to do so of their 
own free will. This assumption no longer works. The model in modern leadership is that 
people should be intrinsically motivated to perform the tasks requested of them. In 
general, Ukrainian workers tend to have greater self-esteem now than they did during 
Soviet Union times. As they become more educated and capable, their employers must 
take new approaches. Table 2 below summarizes the shift in leadership strategy. 
 
Old Expectations of Leaders New Expectations of Leaders 
• Get results by directing people and getting 
compliance. 
• Create strong followers who respect 
authority. 
• Get people to follow policy and procedure. 
• Facilitators/Process Consultants: managers 
will need to facilitate the flow of 
information in groups and between groups. 
The manager in this role, in addition to 
attention paid to content, will need to pay 
close attention to process - the way people 
work together to accomplish objectives. 
• Liasons/Linking Pins/Network Builders: 
formally or informally, managers will be in 
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• Develop individual strengths within 
department. 
• Implement orders for the above (within the 
organization). 
• Be responsible for the actions of the work 
unit. 
• Be excellent at the technical work 
performed in the department. 
• Control people to produce the highest 
possible output. 
a position to bring groups together to solve 
common problems. Work within groups is 
constantly affected by actions of external 
groups with whom the leader should relate.
• Integrator/Innovator/Decision Maker: 
managers must be able to integrate 
information, conceptualize possible 
alternatives, and plan productive courses of 
action.  
• Conflict Managers/Relationship Builders: 
as the number of parties involved in 
problem solving increases, so does the 
number of different points of view. Leaders 
need to develop skills to manage conflict 
productively and build cooperative 
relationships  
• Evaluators/Resource Allocators:  Helping 
employees learn to evaluate their own and 
one another’s performance takes time and 
patience; allocating resources also becomes 
more challenging when leaders can no 
longer rely on hierarchical authority to 
make resource allocation decisions. 
• Inspirational Leader: leaders will need to 
help maintain a common vision among 
different autonomous groups. Leaders will 
also have to push for exploration of what is 
possible rather than relying on rules to 
point the way toward the future.” (Pasmore, 
1988, p.148) 
Table 2.   New Leadership Strategies.  
C. SYSTEMATIZATION OF FRAUD CASES: A NET-CENTRIC RESPONSE 
The net-centric warfare concept, concisely represented by official defense 
oriented web site Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium 
(https://www.ncoic.org/), is a set of war fighting concepts and capabilities that allow 
warfighters to take full advantage of all available information and bring all available 
assets to bear in a rapid and flexible manner. Information in this concept plays the most 
crucial role.  
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To create informational advantage, discovered fraud cases need to be 
systematized and analyzed for both training purposes and for detecting similar fraudulent 
schemes. An effective systematization of fraud cases for educational purposes is given in 
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ (AFCE’s) Report to the Nation. The 2008 
Report studies 959 cases of occupational fraud in the United States, which can be applied 
to similar situations in Ukraine, and in the Armed Forces organizations, specifically. The 
study found some interesting trends, classifying occupational fraud into three major 
categories (Figure 5): 
• Asset misappropriation, which involves larceny or misuse of an 
organization’s assets 
• Corruption, which includes kickbacks, bid-rigging, and hidden business 
interests in vendors 
• Fraudulent financial statements, which includes overstating revenues and 
understating liabilities and expenses 
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Figure 5.   Occupational Fraud and Abuse Classification System (from ACFE, 2008) 
Asset Misappropriation is involved in 91.5% cases of all fraudulent activity with 
median losses of $150K (ACFE, 2008). The ACFE subdivides asset misappropriation 
schemes into nine categories (Table 3).  
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Table 3.   Assets Misappropriation Classification (from ACFE, 2008). 
Statistics show that a majority of fraud cases involve cash. As seen in Table 3, 
eight of nine categories are cash related, and fraudulent disbursements are the most 
popular form of cash schemes. Procurement billing schemes are most commonly 
involved. The idea of using a structured fraud analyzing process for assessing new cases 
is similar to the process of malware detection in computer science and inspired the author 
to research a computer antivirus strategy for building an anti-fraud system.  
Following computer science approaches, an analogy between computer viruses 
(malware) and fraud can be made. Computer malware and fraud have many similarities 
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including negative outcomes, malicious intent, hidden behaviors, distorted reasoning, and 
so on. As engineers and mathematicians, the computer scientists who produce antivirus 
software seek clear, straightforward solutions. Their strategies can be extrapolated and 
used to combat fraud. The following ideas from this field are extremely valuable: 
• Antivirus strategies imply a sequence of actions. All actions have equal 
importance and must be done in proper order, without omission. The 
optimal order consists of (1) examining for viruses using a virus 
dictionary, (2) identifying suspicious behavior from any process or 
computer program that can indicate infection (heuristic analysis), (3) 
placing resident controls in the system, (4) monitoring control system 
integrity, and (5) periodically scanning the whole system.   
• An antivirus system must be flexible. The best antivirus systems contain 
several independent but interrelated modules. Each module provides a 
discrete aspect of control and can be added or switched off depending on 
user resources, control objectives, and the required level of security. 
Tighter control demands greater resources, such as computer memory or 
central processor capability. 
• A control system should be as dynamic as possible. Modern antivirus 
systems update their dictionary of known viruses and their software on a 
daily or hourly basis. 
Analogically to antivirus software, a fraud prevention program needs to start with 
an analysis of the probability that fraud already has occurred in the organization.  All 
crucial internal control elements are based on managers’ integrity. There is always the 
possibility of management override of the internal control system. Therefore, similarly to 
antivirus software, the environment needs to be scanned for potential fraud. Appropriate 
additional “heuristic” analysis of suspicious behavior would also be an effective tool. All 
of these elements can be used in an anti-fraud program. However, even the most effective 
internal control program is not free from limitations. 
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D. EFFECTIVENES AND EFFICIENCY OF INTERNAL CONTROL (COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS) 
There are several factors that can limit internal control, which include internal 
control complexity and excessive cost. Each of these factors can be a barrier to the 
effective control of an organization. Being aware of these factors aids leadership in 
maximizing the effectiveness of an operation, whether in a governmental or corporate 
environment.   
 Complicated internal control measures can be misunderstood by employees who 
are fatigued or exercise poor judgment (Whittington & Pany, 2008, p. 256). Although a 
complex internal control system is feasible in theory, actual measures may be too 
cumbersome to be practical. The result of complex, all-embracing systems may be 
confusion and misunderstanding. 
Even a sound internal control system can be cost ineffective if its costs outweigh 
its value to operations. Therefore, in a non-fraud environment, management tends to 
discard internal controls. Since a perfect control system is expensive and could produce a 
non-optimal output, and a cost-efficient control system is unable to significantly decrease 
fraud risk, there is a cost dilemma.  The optimal internal control system should benefit 
the organization at a reasonable cost, a compromise which is difficult to achieve. 
Recognizing that control measures provide reasonable rather than absolute assurance in 
addition to the possibility of management’s overriding any control measures are 
important limiting factors to consider. (Whittington & Pany, 2008).  
The relevancy (or efficiency) of internal controls must be discussed. As Bradford 
Cadmus and Arthur J. E. Child, authors of Internal Control Against Fraud and Waste, 
observe,  
Even though a certain control measure is possible, it may not be necessary 
or desirable. Every measure of control should meet these tests: Does it 
control something that is worthwhile to control? Are minor items rigidly 
controlled because such control is feasible, while major items are less 
rigidly controlled because control is harder to establish? Does it meet 
protective requirements on a practical basis? Whether it be a petty cash 
fund, a storeroom, or a variety chain store, the complication and cost of 
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protective control must be appraised in relation to possible exposure to 
fraud, waste, or loss. Is it flexible to meet changing business conditions? 
(Cadmus & Child, 1953, p. 305).  
However, the effectiveness of an internal control system is mostly measured 
arbitrarily by leadership/management judgment. The ultimate measure of effectiveness 
should not be the cost, but the capability of providing reasonable assurance that control 
objectives have been met (see Chapter II for definition of control objectives).  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has underscored the relevancy of the Ukrainian military leaders who 
will play a crucial role in control-system transformation. It discussed the significance of 
the informational component of an anti-fraud program as well as the systemization of 
fraud cases. In addition, the effectiveness and efficiency of internal control were 
addressed. The implementation of a fraud management system at the organizational level 
in the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be a great benefit. 
The guidelines provided in the Commander’s Guide should enable personnel to 
use the document as a template for creating other guides, for preventing payroll fraud, 
skimming, check tampering, etc. 
The inherent limitations of an internal control system are important to understand 
and should be factored in during the system design phase. An internal control system 
should be relevant to its objective. Excessive control often brings confusion and 
misunderstanding, in addition to extra cost. 
Chapter V provides the actual Commander’s Guide.  
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V. A COMMANDER'S (OR EXECUTIVE OFFICER'S) GUIDE 
FOR DETECTING AND DETERRING PROCUREMENT FRAUD IN 
A MILITARY UNIT (OR ORGANIZATION) OF THE ARMED 
FORCES OF UKRAINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Association of Certified Fraud examiners’ (ACFE) fraud examiner’s manual 
states that fraud prevention demands a system of rules and action in order to minimize the 
possibility of fraud occurring and  maximize the possibility of detecting any fraudulent 
activity. The manual states that the “potential of being caught most often persuades likely 
perpetrators not to commit the fraud. Because of this principle, the existence of a 
thorough control system is essential to fraud prevention.” (Fraud Examiner’s Manual, 
2007, p.4.601) 
The key words here are “the potential of being caught” and “the existence of a 
thorough control system”—two main elements critical in any effective fraud prevention 
program.  
This suggested Commander’s Guide includes procedures and guidelines that 
could be helpful in deterring and detecting fraud and in establishing an anti-fraud 
prevention program. It is recommended that the commander create a fraud investigating 
team or task force to conduct the recommended anti-fraud activities. This task force is a 
key element of an anti-fraud program.  
The fraud task force should perform fraud detection procedures using the fraud 
indicator guidelines presented in this chapter. The creation and development of effective 
internal controls demand significant resources, time, and training before first-time basic 
procedures can be put in place. This guide will provide examples of anti-fraud internal 
control elements. Section B will provide fraud indicator guidelines. Section C will 
discuss guidelines for a basic fraud prevention program. Section D will cover guidelines 
for establishing an advanced anti-fraud internal control system. Section E includes a 
procurement fraud dictionary. Section F includes a summary of the detailed guidelines. 
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B. FRAUD INDICATOR GUIDELINES 
These guidelines suggest three consecutive steps to mitigate fraud. First, fraud can 
be detected by analyzing suspicious behavior or actions. Second, if fraud is detected, the 
fraud investigating team should perform the appropriate actions to investigate the 
fraudulent activity more thoroughly and to prevent the concealment of facts. Third, to 
resolve fraud cases, the commander should take disciplinary and legal actions against 
fraud perpetrators.     
1. Fraud Detection 
There are four major types of indicators that suggest fraudulent activity: 
situational, accounting, documentary, and behavioral.  
Situational Indicators: (adapted from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID)  Fraud Indicators Handbook, 2009). 
a. Procurement Planning 
• Continual vacillation about what an organization wants or inadequate 
development of a needs assessment 
• Requiring excessively high stock levels and inventories in order to justify 
continuing purchasing activity from certain contractors 
• Declaring serviceable items as excess or selling them as surplus while 
continuing to purchase similar items 
• Purchasing items and services in response to aggressive marketing efforts 
(and possible favors, bribes. or gratuities) by contractors rather than in 
response to valid requirements 
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b. Solicitation Phase   
• Using statements of work, specifications, or sole-source justifications 
developed by or in consultation with a preferred contractor (institutional 
conflict of interest) 
• Bid specifications or statements of work are not consistent with the items 
included in the general requirements 
• Falsified statements to justify sole source of negotiated procurement 
• Placing unnecessary restrictions in solicitation documents (confidentiality, 
etc.), which could tend to restrict competition 
• Limiting the time for submission of bids so that only those with advance 
information have adequate time to prepare bids or proposals 
• “Referring” a contractor to a specific subcontractor, expert, or source of 
supply. Expressing or implying that using the referred business will more 
than likely secure the contract 
• Improper acceptance of late bids 
• Changes in a bid after other bidders’ prices are known. This is sometimes 
done by deliberately “planting” mistakes in a bid 
• Falsification of information concerning contractor qualifications, financial 
capability, qualifications of personnel and successful performance of 
previous jobs, etc. 
• Seemingly unnecessary personal contacts between involved managers and 
contractor’s personnel during the solicitation, evaluation, and negotiation 
processes 
• Using biased evaluation criteria or biased individuals on the evaluation 
panel 
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• Dealing with oddly-named vendors which suggests that the firm may not 
provide the type of service or product being solicited 
c. Source Selection  
• Award of a contract to a contractor who is not the lowest responsible, 
responsive bidder 
• Material changes in the contract shortly after award 
• Awards made to contractors with an apparent history of poor performance 
• Awards made that include items other than those contained in bid 
specifications 
• Backdated or after-the-fact justifications in the contract file or contracts 
signed by persons without the authority to approve noncompetitive 
procurement 
d. Contract Administration 
•  Certified receipt of goods and services even though physical inspections 
have not been performed 
• Contractors failing to meet contract terms but nothing done to enforce 
compliance 
• Fictitious or inordinate time frames and dates on contractor records (e.g. 
gasoline, vehicle, maintenance, inspection, or receiving reports). 
• Excessive or insufficient freight expense relative to inventory purchased 
or to sales. May indicate that purchases have been paid through means not 
reflected on the books or inventory purchased or sales made for 
unrecorded cash 
• Used or inferior products substituted for product actually ordered 
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• Significant increase in power consumption in a manufacturing facility 
without a corresponding increase in production or revenue 
• Using cash to pay vendors instead of relying on electronic bank systems 
Accounting Record Indicators: (adapted from the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)  No 99). 
• Transactions not recorded in a complete or timely manner or improperly 
recorded as to amount, period, or budget classification code 
• Purchased items not recorded in inventory records 
• Unsupported or unauthorized transactions 
• Last-minute or unauthorized adjustments 
Documentary (Source Documents) Indicators: (adapted from AICPA SAS 
No 99 and Inspector General Shell Company and Suspect Purchases, 2009). 
• Missing electronic or hardcopy documents that “materialize” later in the 
review 
• Availability of only photocopied documents instead of original 
documents. Copies are poor quality or illegible. It is a simple matter to 
alter approved invoices with white-out or similar correction fluid and copy 
the invoice while destroying the original. 
• Out-of-sequence invoices in files or unnumbered invoices where serial 
numbering is the rule 
• Documents from competing firms containing similar or identical company 
names, handwriting/signatures, stationery, invoice numbers (in sequence), 
telephone numbers 
• Significant unexplained items on reconciliations 
• Inconsistent, vague, or implausible accounting reports or analytical 
documents sent to different organizations 
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• Unusual discrepancies between computer report totals and source 
documentation. Missing signatures of approval. 
• Discrepancies between accounting records and confirmation replies  
All of these indicators must be assumed as red flags, reported to the 
oversight agency, and investigated accordingly. 
Behavioral Indicators: Employee behaviors may indicate fraudulent 
activity. Two groups of indicators that can be used for detection of fraud include behavior 
that shows a high probability that a fraud has occurred and employee incentives and 
reasons to commit the fraud. Behavior that shows a high probability of fraud (adopted 
from Whittington & Pany, 2008) include: 
• Denial of access to records, facilities, certain employees, customers, 
vendors, or others related to possible evidence 
• Complaints by management about the conduct of the audit or management 
intimidation of auditors  
• Unusual delays by the entity in providing requested information 
• Tips or complaints to the auditors about fraud from employees 
• Unwillingness or denial of access to key electronic files for testing 
In addition to the above indicators, there are three conditions or factors 
that are generally present when fraud occurs. First, management or employees will have 
an incentive or situational pressure that provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, the 
opportunity for a fraud will exist, caused mostly by the absence of controls or the ability 
of management to override controls. Third, lack of personal integrity or the ability to 
rationalize committing a fraudulent act will generally also be present. 
Fraud is usually found if there is a negative balance of all these factors 
(Figure 6). Elimination of only one will not stop fraud if critical levels of other factors 
outweigh it.  
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Figure 6.   Three key variables model of fraud (from Albrecht et al., 1982, p 39) 
(1) Situational Pressures: (adapted from Albrecht et al., 1982) 
There are many motivations for fraud, most related to greed, such as living 
beyond one’s means, having an immediate financial need, possessing debts, poor credit, 
and a drug or gambling addiction, and experiencing family pressure. While this list is not 
inclusive, answers to these questions can help identify fraud perpetrators: 
• Do any involved employees have unusually high personal debts or 
financial losses that probably exceed their level of income? 
• Do the incomes of any key employees appear inadequate to cover normal 
personal and family expenses? 
• Do any key employees appear to be living beyond their means? 
• Are any key employees involved in extensive FOREX, stock market, or 
other speculation so that a downturn would cause severe financial 
difficulty? 
• Are any key employees involved in excessive or habitual gambling? 
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• Do any key employees have unusually high expenses resulting from 
personal involvement with other people, especially the opposite sex (e.g., 
maintenance of separate apartments)? 
• Do any key employees feel undue family, community, or social 
expectations or pressures? 
• Do any key employees use alcohol or drugs excessively? 
• Do any key employees strongly believe that they are being treated unfairly 
(e.g., underpaid, poor job assignments)? 
• Do any key employees appear to resent their superiors? 
• Are any employees unduly frustrated with their jobs? 
• Is there an undue amount of pressure for employees to achieve in this 
organization, so that success is more important than ethics? 
• Do any key employees appear to exhibit extreme greed or an 
overwhelming desire for self-enrichment or personal gain?  
(2) Opportunities: (adapted from Albrecht et al., 1982, Broader, 2000, COSO 
Internal Control—Integrated Framework, 1992, and GAO-01-1008G, 2001).  
Weak internal control is the crucial factor that creates opportunity for fraud. The 
following are questions at the organizational level. While this list is not inclusive, 
answers to these questions can help identify fundamental internal control weaknesses. 
• Are there codes of conduct or ethics policies? 
• Do control systems test for compliance with codes of conduct? 
• Does the organization inform employees about rules of personal conduct 
and the discipline meted out to fraud perpetrators? 
• Are the accounting department and other key structures of the organization 
adequately staffed? 
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• Is it easy to recognize management’s leadership philosophy and operating 
style? 
• Do formal subordinate manager-employee relations prevail over the 
informal relations? 
• Do human resource policies and practices contain rules and incentives for 
honest behavior? 
• Is there an adequate anti-fraud training program for employees? 
• Do any key employees have close associations with suppliers/contractors 
or individuals who might have motives inconsistent with the 
organization’s welfare? 
• Have any key employees recently failed to take annual vacations? 
• Does the organization have adequate personnel screening policies when 
hiring new employees to fill positions of trust? 
• Are executive disclosures of personal investments or incomes required? 
• Is the organization dominated by only one or two individuals? 
• Does the organization appear to operate continually on a crisis basis? 
• Does the organizations place too much trust in key employees? 
• Does the organization lack a good system of internal security (e.g., locks, 
safes, fences, gates, and guards)?  
• Is the organization highly computerized? If so, are there sufficient controls 
over hardware, software, computer personnel, etc.? 
• Do policies and procedures ensure critical decisions are made with 
appropriate approval? 
• Are key risk-taking activities appropriately segregated from reconciliation 
activities? 
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• Do all personnel understand their accountability for the activities they 
conduct?  
(3) Rationalizations and Personal Integrity:  (adapted from Albrecht et 
al.,1992). 
The next list of questions suggests a set of rationalizations that define the 
fraudulent behavior most likely to occur in a given situation. While this list is not 
inclusive, answers to these questions can help identify people likely to commit fraud. 
• Do any of the key employees appear to have low moral character?  
• When confronted with difficulty, do any of the key employees appear 
consistently to rationalize contradictory behavior? 
• Do any of the key employees appear to lack a strong personal code of 
honesty? 
• Do any key employees appear to be "wheeler-dealer" individuals who 
enjoy feelings of power, influence, social status, and excitement associated 
with financial transactions involving large sums of money? 
• Do any of the key employees appear to be unstable (e.g., frequent job 
changes or changes of residence, mental problems)? 
• Do any key employees appear to be intrigued by the personal challenge of 
subverting a system of controls (i.e., a desire to beat the system)? 
• Do any key employees have criminal or questionable backgrounds? 
• Do any employees have poor credit ratings? 
• Do any employees have poor past work records or references?  
2. Follow-Up Detection Procedures  
If a fraud investigative unit identifies a red flag, it should change and/or extend 
the auditing procedures. Some helpful examples of extra procedures are the following 
(not inclusive): 
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• Observe inventory on unexpected dates or at unexpected locations, or 
count cash on a surprise basis 
• Examine the data for the same vendor, amount, and date (duplicate 
information to allow for vendor submitting the same invoice but changing 
the invoice number). 
• Compare check numbers against dates issued. Checks should be issued in 
sequence by check number and date. 
• Check for differences in addresses, such as slightly different or incorrect 
post office boxes and different postal codes for the same address, different 
street numbers, or alternating addresses. 
• Look for checks to different vendors going to the same mailing address. 
• Look for checks to different vendors deposited in the same bank account. 
• Examine the data for split purchases (transactions on the same day to the 
same vendor, transactions in round amounts (e.g., $100, $300, or just 
slightly below the established micro purchase threshold). 
• Compare the purchase order date and the invoice date for after-the-fact 
purchases. 
• Interview personnel involved in activities in areas where a risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud has been identified to obtain their insights about 
the risk and how controls address the risk. 
• Report to the Control and Oversight Department and ask for a professional 
audit.  
• Establish lock-and-key control procedures for audited documentation and 
data to prevent unauthorized access of fraud-involved personnel. 
• Suspend or reassign employees suspected of fraudulent activity.  
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3. Fraud Resolution 
Any action taken should be appropriate under the circumstances and applied 
consistently to all levels of employees, including senior management. Possible actions 
include one or more of the following (adapted from the Institute of Internal Auditors, 
2008): 
Criminal Referral. The organization may refer the case to law enforcement 
according to the criminal code of Ukraine. Referrals for criminal prosecution may 
increase the deterrent effect of a fraud prevention policy.  
Civil Action. The organization must pursue its own civil action against the 
perpetrators to recover funds.  
Disciplinary Action. The organization must take internal disciplinary action 
according to service regulations for military offenders and termination, demotion, or 
warnings for civilians.  
Extended Investigation. The Control and Oversight Department is responsible for 
conducting a root-cause analysis and extended investigation. It can identify similar 
misconduct elsewhere in the organization.  
Internal Control Remediation. The organization should step up internal control 
activities through either a basic fraud prevention program or an advanced anti-fraud 
internal control program, depending on the resources available and time limitations.  
C. GUIDELINES FOR A BASIC FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAM 
1. Fraud Task Force 
To provide a first-time fraud checkup, a unit’s commander should create a 
temporary or permanent fraud investigation unit that will be responsible for the detection, 
investigation, and prevention of fraud. It is strongly encouraged that senior management 
be represented on this team.  The chief financial officer should lead this unit. The fraud 
investigation unit should have a mission statement that provides clear objectives.It is 
better to use language with positive connotations when naming the team:  “financial 
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integrity” rather than “control”, “audit,” or “investigation” team. The team should include 
both senior management and professionally trained or experienced financial control 
systems people.  
2. Whistle-Blower Programs and Anti-Fraud Hotlines 
The American experience teaches that fraud is often uncovered and exposed by 
people with inside knowledge, including employees, suppliers, and customers. Tips from 
employees are the most common source of fraud detection, and hotlines are the reporting 
mechanism of choice. (ACFE, 2008) 
The ACFE (2008) found that tips were the most common way frauds were 
detected, far more often than through internal or external audits or internal control 
systems. Tips uncovered 46.2 % of fraud cases, while internal audits accounted for 19.4% 
and external audits only 9.1%. In addition, most tipsters are employees (ACFE, 2008).  
It is easy to say that a commander should support whistle-blowers. In reality, 
however, members of the military community in Ukraine traditionally do not use positive 
terms when referring to those who blow the whistle on fraud and abuse. Rather, they are 
deemed rats, snitches, betrayers, and worse. 
To avoid negative employee attitudes towards the program, the following 
suggestions by Biegelman & Bartow (2006) would be useful for setting up hotlines: 
• Choose the right name. Instead of the standard term “hotline,” a less 
threatening title such as an “aware line,” “advice line” or “integrity 
helpline” may be in order. 
• The hotline number must be easily accessible.  
• The number must be toll free.  
• The hotline must be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. 
• Maintaining the confidentiality and anonymity of hotline callers is 
absolutely critical to the success of the hotline. Confidentiality means that 
the caller’s identity and information will not be communicated broadly to 
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those without a need to know, while anonymity provides secrecy and 
nondisclosure of the caller’s identity, but not the information obtained. 
• The hotline must be staffed by live people versus computer generated 
voice responses  
• The caller should be advised that the calls are not recorded or traced. 
• Hotlines should take calls covering all kinds of wrongdoing: fraud, abuse, 
corruption, theft, sexual harassment, workplace violence, and other 
violations. (Biegelman & Bartow, 2006) 
Potential reporters of fraud should have as many communication channels 
available as possible to report fraud: telephone, e-mail, letter, and fax. Another basic 
recommendation for helping to deter and detect fraud is an anti-fraud training program. 
3. Anti-Fraud Training  
Fraud prevention begins with training. Training should be required for all 
employees, from the executive level down, and should cover code of conduct, risk of 
fraud, and the employee’s role in preventing fraud. 
There are many ways to deliver quality training including professional seminars, 
internet-based, interactive training modules, and postgraduate courses. Because 
organizations are usually limited in their training budget, it is better to provide training 
programs separately, according to the organizational level in which personnel are 
involved in the actual fraud preventive program. Fraud investigators (task forces) should 
be trained externally by certified professionals, and in turn may provide in-house training 
for managers and employees. Using a task force for educating employees has the 
additional preventative benefits of showing potential fraud perpetrators that there is a 
professional investigative unit within the organization and of sending an important 
message that improper conduct has consequences and will not be tolerated. 
As Kenneth R. Dieffenbach, CFE, suggests a basic fraud awareness training for 
employees, which should include the following basic elements: 
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• Give a simple definition of fraud: fraud is lying, cheating, and 
stealing from the organization. 
• Discuss how fraud negatively impacts a company’s bottom line 
and reputation. 
• Give examples of various fraud schemes employees might 
discover, such as an offer for kickbacks or the illegal use of customers’ 
credit-card numbers by other employees. 
• Tell employees what they are supposed to do if they suspect a 
fraud. (as cited in Biegelman & Bartow, 2006, p.298.) 
One more effective training approach is setting a good example for others to 
follow. Good leaders are always role models for their subordinates, providing guidance, 
mentoring, and giving examples of honesty and integrity. Such behavior has a great 
impact on preventing fraud.  
Biegelman & Bartow(2006) suggest providing separate, more detailed, anti-fraud 
training for managers for two reasons. First, the credibility of the “tone at the top” begins 
with a unit’s first-line leaders. Second, managers need a broad understanding of the kinds 
of internal and external frauds that can attack an organization. 
D. GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING AN ADVANCED ANTI-FRAUD 
INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM 
The following guidelines for establishing an advanced anti-fraud internal control 
program in military units and organizations is adapted from the U.S. General Accounting 
Office’s publication for internal control standards, Internal Control Management and 
Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G, 2001. It will cover the five components of an internal 
control system, which include the control environment, risk assessment, control activities, 
information and communication, and monitoring. 
1. The Control Environment 
Management and employees should establish and maintain an environment 
throughout the organization that sets a positive and supportive attitude toward internal 
control and conscientious management.  
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a. Integrity and Ethical Values 
(1) The organization should establish and use a formal code of 
conduct and other policies communicating appropriate ethical and moral behavioral 
standards. Consider the following: 
• The codes are comprehensive in nature and directly address 
issues such as improper payments, appropriate use of 
resources, conflicts of interest, and use of due professional 
care.  
• The codes are periodically acknowledged by signature from 
all employees. 
• Employees indicate that they know what kind of behavior 
is acceptable and unacceptable, what penalties 
unacceptable behavior may bring, and what to do if they 
become aware of unacceptable behavior. 
 
(2) An ethical tone should be established at the top of the 
organization. Consider the following: 
• Management fosters and encourages an organizational 
culture that emphasizes the importance of integrity and 
ethical values. This might be achieved through different 
media: intranet, oral communications in meetings, via one-
on-one discussions, and by example in day-to-day 
activities. 
• Employees indicate that peer pressure exists for appropriate 
moral and ethical behavior. 
• Management takes quick and appropriate action as soon as 
there are any signs that a problem may exist. 
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(3)  Dealings with the external organizations and employees 
should be conducted on a high ethical level. Consider the following: 
• Management cooperates with auditors and other evaluators, 
discloses known problems to them, and values their 
comments and recommendations. 
• The organization has a well-defined and understood 
process for dealing with employee claims and concerns in a 
timely and appropriate manner. 
(4) Appropriate disciplinary action should be taken in response 
to departures from approved policies and procedures or violations of the code of conduct. 
Consider the following: 
• Management takes action when there are violations of 
policies, procedures, or the code of conduct. 
• The types of disciplinary actions that can be taken are 
widely communicated throughout the organization so that 
others know that if they behave improperly, they will face 
similar consequences. 
 
(5) Management should appropriately address intervention or 
overriding of internal controls. Consider the following: 
• Any leadership decision about intervention or overriding of 
internal control is fully documented as to reasons and 
specific actions taken. 
• Overriding of internal control by low-level management 
personnel is prohibited except in emergency situations 
Upper-level management is immediately notified and the 
circumstances are documented. 
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(6) Management should remove temptation for unethical 
behavior. Consider the following: 
• Management has a sound basis for setting realistic and 
achievable goals and does not pressure employees to meet 
unrealistic ones. 
• Management provides fair, non-extreme incentives (as 
opposed to unfair and unnecessary temptations) to help 
ensure integrity and adherence to ethical values. 
• Compensation and promotion are based on achievements 
and performance. 
b. Commitment to Competence 
(1) Management should identify and define the tasks required 
to accomplish particular jobs and fill the various positions. Consider the following: 
• Management has analyzed the tasks that need to be 
performed for particular jobs and given consideration to 
such things as the level of judgment required and the extent 
of supervision necessary. 
• Formal job descriptions or other means of identifying and 
defining specific tasks required for job positions have been 
established and are up to date. 
(2) The organization should perform analyses of the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform jobs appropriately. Consider the 
following: 
• The knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for various jobs 
have been identified and made known to employees. 
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• Evidence exists that the agency attempts to assure that 
employees selected for various positions have the requisite 
knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
(3) The organization should provide training and counseling in 
order to help employees maintain and improve their competence for their jobs. Consider 
the following: 
• There is an appropriate training program to meet the needs 
of all employees (if it is not feasible to provide such 
program at the organizational level, the management must 
ask for help from the parent organization or agency). 
• Performance appraisals are based on an assessment of 
critical job factors and clearly identify areas in which the 
employee is performing well and areas that need 
improvement. 
• Employees are provided candid and constructive job 
performance counseling. 
(4) Key senior-level employees should have a demonstrated 
ability in general management and extensive practical experience in operating 
governmental or business entities. 
c. Management’s Philosophy and Operating Style 
(1) Unit (organization) leadership should have an appropriate 
attitude toward risk taking and proceeds with new ventures, missions, or operations only 
after carefully analyzing the risks involved and determining how they may be minimized 
or mitigated. 
(2) Management should enthusiastically endorse the use of 
performance-based management. 
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(3) There should not be excessive personnel turnover in key 
functions, such as operations and program management or accounting. Consider the 
following: 
• There has not been excessive turnover of supervisory 
personnel related to internal control problems, and there is 
a strategy for dealing with turnover related to constraints 
and limitations such as salary caps. 
• Key personnel have not quit unexpectedly. 
• Personnel turnover has not been so great as to impair 
internal control as a result of employing many people new 
to their jobs and unfamiliar with the control activities and 
responsibilities. 
• There is no pattern to personnel turnover that would 
indicate a problem with the emphasis that management 
places on internal control. 
(4) Management should have a positive and supportive attitude 
toward the functions of accounting, information management systems, personnel 
operations, monitoring, and internal and external audits and evaluations. Consider the 
following: 
• The financial accounting and budgeting operations are 
considered essential to the well-being of the organization 
and viewed as methods for exercising control over the 
entity’s various activities. 
• Management regularly relies on accounting/financial and 
programmatic data from its systems for decision-making 
purposes and performance evaluation. 
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• If the accounting operation is decentralized, unit accounting 
personnel also have reporting responsibility to the central 
financial officer(s). 
• The financial management, accounting operations, and 
budget execution operations are under the direction of the 
chief financial officer, and strong synchronization and 
coordination exists between budgetary and proprietary 
financial accounting activities. 
• Management looks to the information management 
function for critical operating data and supports efforts to 
make improvements in the systems as technology advances. 
• Personnel operations have a high priority and senior 
executives emphasize the importance of good human-
capital management. 
• Management places a high degree of importance on the 
work of the external audits from the Control and Oversight 
Department of the MoD or other governmental oversight 
structures as well as other evaluations and studies and is 
responsive to information developed through such 
products. 
(5) Valuable assets and information should be safeguarded 
from unauthorized access or use. 
(6) There should be frequent interaction between senior 
management and operating/program management, especially when operating from 
geographically dispersed locations. 
(7) Management should have an appropriate attitude toward 
financial, budgetary, and operational/programmatic reporting. Consider the following: 
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• Management is informed and involved in critical financial 
reporting issues and supports a conservative approach 
toward the application of accounting principles and 
estimates. 
• Management discloses all financial, budgetary, and 
programmatic information needed to fully understand the 
operations and financial condition of the organization. 
• Management avoids focus on short-term reported results 
only. 
• Personnel do not submit inappropriate or inaccurate reports 
in order to meet targets. 
• Facts are not exaggerated and budgetary estimates are not 
stretched to a point of unreasonableness.  
d. Organizational Structure 
(1) The organizational structure should be appropriate for its 
size and the nature of its operations. Consider the following: 
• The organizational structure facilitates the flow of 
information throughout the structure. 
• The organizational structure is appropriately centralized or 
decentralized, given the nature of its operations, and 
management has clearly articulated the considerations and 
factors taken into account in balancing the degree of 
centralization versus decentralization. 
(2) Key areas of authority and responsibility should be defined 
and communicated throughout the organization. Consider the following: 
• Executives in charge of major activities or functions are 
fully aware of their duties and responsibilities. 
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• An accurate and updated organizational chart showing key 
areas of responsibility is provided to all employees. 
• Executives and key managers understand their internal 
control responsibilities and ensure that their staffalso 
understand their own responsibilities. 
(3) Appropriate and clear internal reporting relationships 
should be established. Consider the following: 
• Reporting relationships have been established and 
effectively provide managers information they need to 
carry out their responsibilities and perform their jobs. 
• Employees are aware of the established reporting 
relationships. 
• Mid-level managers can easily communicate with senior 
operating executives. 
(4) Management should periodically evaluate the 
organizational structure and make changes as necessary in response to changing 
conditions. 
(5) The agency should have the appropriate number of 
employees, particularly in managerial positions. Consider the following: 
• Managers and supervisors have time to carry out their 
duties and responsibilities. 
• Employees do not have to work excessive overtime or 
outside the ordinary workweek to complete assigned tasks. 
• Managers and supervisors are not fulfilling the roles of 
more than one employee. 
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e. Assignment of Authority and Responsibility 
(1) The organization should appropriately assign authority and 
delegate responsibility to the proper personnel to deal with organizational goals and 
objectives. Consider the following: 
• Authority and responsibility are clearly assigned 
throughout the organization and this is clearly 
communicated to all employees. 
• Responsibility for decision making is clearly linked to the 
assignment of authority, and individuals are held 
accountable accordingly. 
• Management has effective procedures to monitor results. 
(2) Each employee should know how his actions interrelate 
with others, taking into account the way in which authority and responsibilities are 
assigned, and should be aware of the related duties concerning internal control. Consider 
the following: 
• Job descriptions clearly indicate the degree of authority and 
accountability delegated to each position and the 
responsibilities assigned. 
• Job descriptions and performance evaluations contain 
specific references to internal control-related duties, 
responsibilities, and accountability. 
(3) The delegation of authority should be appropriate in 
relation to the assignment of responsibility. Consider the following: 
• Employees at the appropriate levels are empowered to 
correct problems or implement improvements. 
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• There is an appropriate balance between the delegation of 
authority at lower levels to get the job done and the 
involvement of senior-level personnel. 
f. Human Resource Policies and Practices 
(1)  Policies and procedures should be in place for hiring, 
orienting, training, evaluating, counseling, promoting, compensating, disciplining, and 
terminating employees. Consider the following: 
• Management communicates information to recruiters about 
the type of competencies needed for the work or 
participates in the hiring process. 
• The agency has standards or criteria for hiring qualified 
people, with emphasis on education, experience, 
accomplishment, and ethical behavior. 
• Position descriptions and qualifications are in accordance 
with the standards accepted throughout the MoD of 
Ukraine for similar jobs. 
• A training program has been established and includes 
orientation programs for new employees and ongoing 
training for all employees. 
• Promotion, compensation, and rotation of employees are 
based on periodic performance appraisals. 
• The importance of integrity and ethical values is reflected 
in performance appraisal criteria. 
• Employees are provided with appropriate feedback and 
counseling on their job performance and suggestions for 
improvements. 
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• Disciplinary or remedial action is taken in response to 
violations of policies or ethical standards. 
• Employment is terminated when deemed necessary, 
following established policies and laws of Ukraine. 
(2) Background checks should be conducted on candidates for 
employment. Consider the following: 
• Candidates who change jobs often are given particularly 
close attention. 
• Hiring standards require investigation to determine if 
potential employees have criminal records  
• References and previous employers are contacted. 
• Educational and professional certifications are confirmed. 
g. Oversight Groups 
(1) Within the organization, there should be mechanisms in 
place to monitor and review operations and programs. Consider the following: 
• Commander has created a temporary or permanent 
investigative/reviewing unit (financial integrity unit) which 
is responsible for reviewing the organization’s activities 
and systems and providing information, analyses, 
appraisals, recommendations, and counsel to management. 
The unit includes senior management and professionally 
trained or experienced staff in financial control systems 
(2) The organization should work closely with oversight 
organizations. Consider the following: 
• The organization has a good working relationship with 
auditors from the Control and Oversight Department of the 
MoD, and major officials from other MoD oversight 
agencies. 
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• High-level organization personnel maintain good working 
relationships with other executive branch agencies that 
exercise multi-agency control responsibilities, such as the 
state tax administration, treasury, and main control and 
revision office of the Ukraine. 
2. Risk Assessment 
A precondition to risk assessment is the establishment of clear, consistent 
organizational goals and objectives at both the entity level and at the activity (program or 
mission) level. Once the objectives have been set, the organization needs to identify the 
risks that could impede the efficient and effective achievement of those objectives. 
a. Establishment of Entity-Wide Objectives 
(1) The organization should establish entity-wide objectives 
that provide sufficiently broad statements and guidance about what the organization is 
supposed to achieve, yet are specific enough to relate directly to the organization. 
Consider the following: 
• Management has established overall entity-wide objectives 
in the form of mission, goals, and objectives. 
• The entity-wide objectives relate to and stem from program 
requirements established by legislation. 
• The entity-wide objectives are specific enough to clearly 
apply to the exact organization instead of applying to all 
military units/organizations. 
(2) Entity-wide objectives should be clearly communicated to 
all employees, and management obtains feedback signifying that the communication has 
been effective. 
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(3) There should be a relationship and consistency between the 
MoD operational strategies and the organization’s objectives and plans. Consider the 
following: 
• The organization’s objectives support the MoD’s strategic 
plans. 
• The organization’s plans address resource allocations and 
priorities. 
• The organization’s plans and budgets are designed with an 
appropriate level of detail for various management levels. 
• Assumptions made in the organization’s plans and budgets 
are consistent with the historical experience and current 
circumstances. 
b. Establishment of Activity-Level Objectives 
(1) Activity-level (program or mission-level) objectives should 
flow from and should be linked with an organization’s entity-wide objectives and plans. 
Consider the following: 
• All significant activities are adequately linked to the entity-
wide objectives and plans. 
• Activity-level objectives are reviewed periodically to 
ensure continued relevance. 
(2) Activity-level objectives should be complementary, 
reinforce each other, and should not be contradictory. 
(3) Activity-level objectives should be relevant to all 
significant organization processes. Consider the following: 
• Objectives have been established for all the key operational 
activities and the support activities. 
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• Activity-level objectives are consistent with effective past 
practices and performance and are consistent with any 
industry or business norms that may be applicable to the 
organization’s operations. 
(4) Activity-level objectives should include measurement 
criteria. 
(5) The organization’s resources should be adequate relative to 
its activity-level objectives. Consider the following: 
• The resources needed to meet the objectives have been 
identified. 
• If adequate resources are not available, management has 
plans to acquire them. 
(6) Management should identify those activity-level objectives 
that are critical to the success of the overall entity-wide objectives. Consider the 
following: 
• Management has identified the processes and activities that 
must occur if the entity-wide objectives are to be met. 
• The critical activity-level objectives receive particular 
attention and review from management and their 
performance is monitored regularly. 
(7) All levels of management should be involved in 
establishing the activity-level objectives and should be committed to their achievement. 
c. Risk Identification 
(1) Management should comprehensively identify risk using 
various methodologies as appropriate. Consider the following: 
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• Qualitative and quantitative methods are used to identify 
risk and determine relative risk rankings on a scheduled 
and periodic basis. 
• How risk is to be identified, ranked, analyzed, and 
mitigated is communicated to appropriate staff. 
• Risk identification and discussion occur in senior-level 
management conferences. 
• Risk identification takes place as a part of short- and long-
term forecasting and planning. 
• Risk identification occurs as a result of consideration of 
findings from audits, evaluations, and other assessments. 
• Risks that are identified at the employee and mid-
management level are brought to the attention of senior-
level managers. 
(2) Adequate mechanisms should exist to identify risks to the 
organization arising from external factors. Consider the following: 
• Risks posed by new legislation or regulations are identified. 
• Risks to the agency as a result of possible natural 
catastrophes or criminal or terrorist actions are taken into 
account. 
• Identification of risks resulting from the political and 
economic changes is determined. 
• Consideration is given to the risks associated with major 
suppliers and contractors. 
• The organization carefully considers any risks resulting 
from its interactions with various other governmental 
entities and parties outside the government. 
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(3) Adequate mechanisms should exist to identify risks to the 
organization arising from internal factors. Consider the following: 
• Risks resulting from downsizing of organization operations 
and personnel because of reformation/reorganizing are 
considered. 
• The organization identifies risks associated with business 
process reengineering or redesign of operating processes. 
• Consideration is given to possible risks resulting from the 
lack of qualifications of personnel hired or the extent to 
which they have been trained or not trained. 
• Risks resulting from heavy reliance on contractors or other 
related parties to perform critical operations are identified. 
• Risk identification activities consider certain human-
capital-related risks, such as the inability to provide 
succession planning and retain key personnel who can 
affect the ability of the organization or program activity to 
function effectively and the inadequacy of compensation 
and benefit programs to keep the organization competitive 
with the private sector for labor. 
• Risks related to the availability of future funding for new 
programs or the continuation of current programs is 
assessed. 
(4) In identifying risk, management should assess other factors 
that may contribute to or increase the risk to which the organization is exposed. Consider 
the following: 
• Management considers any risks related to past failures to 
meet the organization’s missions, goals, or objectives or 
failures to meet budget limitations. 
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• Consideration is given to risks indicated by a history of 
improper program expenditures, violations of funds control, 
or other statutory noncompliance. 
(5) Management should identify risks entity-wide and for each 
significant activity level of the agency. 
d. Risk Analysis 
(1) After the risks to the agency have been identified, 
management should undertake a thorough and complete analysis of their possible effect. 
Consider the following: 
• Management has established a formal process to analyze 
risks, and that process may include informal analysis based 
on day-to-day management activities. 
• Criteria have been established for determining low, 
medium, and high risks. 
• Appropriate levels of management and employees are 
involved in the risk analysis. 
• The risks identified and analyzed are relevant to the 
corresponding activity objective. 
• Risk analysis includes estimating the risk’s significance. 
• Risk analysis includes estimating the likelihood and 
frequency of occurrence of each risk and determining 
whether it falls into the low-, medium-, or high-risk 
category. 
• A determination is made on how best to manage or mitigate 
the risk and what specific actions should be taken. 
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(2)  Management should develop an approach for risk 
management and control based on how much risk can be prudently accepted. Consider 
the following: 
• The approach can vary from one organization to another 
depending upon variances in risks and how much risk can 
be tolerated. 
• The approach is designed to keep risks within levels judged 
to be appropriate and management takes responsibility for 
setting the tolerable risk level. 
• Specific control activities are decided upon to manage or 
mitigate specific risks entity-wide and at each activity 
level. Also, control activity implementation is monitored. 
3. Control Activities 
Internal control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, and 
mechanisms that help ensure that management’s directives to mitigate risks identified 
during the risk assessment process are carried out. Given the wide variety of control 
activities that organizations may employ, it would be impossible for this tool to address 
them all. Therefore, the following will address common categories of control activities. 
a. Common Categories of Control Activities 
(1) Management Reviews at the Functional or Activity Level. 
Organization managers should review actual performance against targets. Consider the 
following: 
• Managers at all activity levels review performance reports, 
analyze trends, and measure results against targets. 
• Both financial and program managers’ review and compare 
financial, budgetary, and operational performance in 
relation to planned or expected results. 
 88
• Appropriate control activities are employed, such as 
reconciliations of summary information to supporting detail 
and checking the accuracy of summarizations of operations. 
(2) Management of Human Capital. The agency should 
effectively manage the organization’s workforce to achieve results. Consider the 
following: 
• The organization has defined the type of leaders it wants 
through written descriptions of roles, responsibilities, 
attributes, and competencies and has established broad 
performance expectations for them. 
• Senior leaders and managers attempt to build teamwork, 
reinforce the shared vision of the organization, and 
encourage feedback from employees, as evidenced by 
actions taken to communicate this to all employees and the 
existence of opportunities for management to obtain 
feedback. 
• Employees are provided orientation, training, and tools to 
perform their duties and responsibilities, improve 
performance, enhance their capabilities, and meet the 
demands of changing organizational needs. 
• The compensation system is adequate to acquire, motivate, 
and retain personnel, and incentives and rewards are 
provided to encourage personnel to perform at maximum 
capability. 
(3) Information Processing. The organization should employ a 
variety of control activities suited to information processing systems to ensure accuracy 
and completeness. Consider the following: 
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• Access to data, files, and programs is appropriately 
controlled. 
(4) Physical Control Over Vulnerable Assets. The organization 
should employ physical control to secure and safeguard vulnerable assets. Consider the 
following: 
• Physical safeguarding policies and procedures have been 
developed, implemented, and communicated to all 
employees. 
• Assets that are particularly vulnerable to loss, theft, 
damage, or unauthorized use, such as cash, securities, 
supplies, inventories, and equipment, are physically 
secured and access to them is controlled. 
• Assets such as cash, securities, supplies, inventories, and 
equipment are periodically counted and compared to 
control records; exceptions are examined. 
• Cash and negotiable securities are maintained under lock 
and key and access to them is strictly controlled. 
• Forms such as blank checks and purchase orders are 
sequentially pre-numbered and physically secured with 
access to them strictly controlled. 
• Equipment vulnerable to theft is securely fastened or 
protected. 
• Identification plates and numbers are affixed to office 
furniture and fixtures, equipment, and other portable assets. 
• Inventories, supplies, and finished items and goods are 
stored in physically secured areas and protected from 
damage. 
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• Facilities are protected from fire by fire alarms and 
sprinkler systems. 
• Access to premises and facilities is controlled by fences, 
guards, or other physical controls. 
• Access to facilities is restricted and controlled during 
nonworking hours. 
(5) Segregation of Duties. Key duties and responsibilities 
should be divided or segregated among different people to reduce the risk of error, waste, 
or fraud. Consider the following: 
• No one individual is allowed to control all key aspects of a 
transaction or event. 
• Responsibilities and duties involving transactions and 
events are separated among different employees with 
respect to authorization, approval, processing and 
recording, making payments or receiving funds, review and 
auditing, and the custodial functions and handling of 
related assets. 
• Duties are assigned systematically to a number of 
individuals to ensure that effective checks and balances 
exist. 
• Where feasible, no one individual is allowed to work alone 
with cash, negotiable securities, or other highly vulnerable 
assets. 
• The responsibility for opening mail is assigned to 
individuals who have no responsibilities for or access to 
files or documents pertaining to accounts receivable or cash 
accounts. 
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• Bank accounts are reconciled by employees who have no 
responsibilities for cash receipts, disbursements, or 
custody. 
• Management is aware that collusion can reduce or destroy 
the control effectiveness of segregation of duties and, 
therefore, is especially alert for it and attempts to reduce 
the opportunities for it to occur. 
(6) Execution of Transactions and Events. Transactions and 
other significant events should be authorized and performed by the appropriate personnel. 
Consider the following: 
• Controls ensure that only valid transactions and other 
events are initiated or entered into, in accordance with 
management’s decisions and directives. 
• Controls are established to ensure that all transactions and 
other significant events that are entered into are authorized 
and executed only by employees acting within the scope of 
their authority. 
• Authorizations are clearly communicated to managers and 
employees and include the specific conditions and terms 
under which authorizations are to be made. 
• The terms of authorizations are in accordance with 
directives and within limitations established by law, 
regulation, and management. 
(7) Recording of Transactions and Events. Transactions and 
other significant events should be properly classified and promptly recorded. Consider 
the following: 
• Transactions and events are appropriately classified and 
promptly recorded so that they maintain their relevance, 
value, and usefulness to management in controlling 
operations and making decisions. 
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• Proper classification and recording take place throughout 
the entire life cycle of each transaction or event, including 
authorization, initiation, processing, and final classification 
in summary records. 
• Proper classification of transactions and events includes 
appropriate organization and format of information on 
original documents (hardcopy paper or electronic) and 
summary records from which reports and statements are 
prepared. 
(8) Access Restrictions to and Accountability for Resources 
and Records. Access to resources and records should be limited, and accountability for 
their custody should be assigned. Consider the following: 
• The risk of unauthorized use or loss is controlled by 
restricting access to resources and records to authorized 
personnel only. 
• Accountability for resources and records custody and use is 
assigned to specific individuals. 
• Access restrictions and accountability assignments for 
custody are periodically reviewed and maintained. 
• Periodic comparison of resources with the recorded 
accountability is made to determine if the two agree, and 
differences are examined. 
• How frequently actual resources are compared to records 
and the degree of access restrictions are functions of the 
vulnerability of the resource to the risk of errors, fraud, 
waste, misuse, theft, or unauthorized alteration. 
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• Management considers such factors as asset value, 
portability, and exchangeability when determining the 
appropriate degree of access restrictions. 
• As a part of assigning and maintaining accountability for 
resources and records, management informs and 
communicates those responsibilities to specific individuals 
within the agency and assures that those people are aware 
of their duties for appropriate custody and use of those 
resources. 
(9) Documentation. Internal Control and all transactions and 
other significant events should be clearly documented. Consider the following: 
• The documentation is readily available for examination. 
• Documentation for internal control includes documentation 
describing and covering automated-information systems, 
data collection and handling, and the specifics of general 
and application control related to such systems. 
• Documentation of transactions and other significant events 
is complete and accurate. Facilitates tracing the transaction 
or event and related information from authorization and 
initiation through processing is completed. 
• Documentation, whether in paper or electronic form, is 
useful to managers in controlling their operations and to 
any others involved in evaluating or analyzing operations. 
• All documentation and records are properly managed, 
maintained, and periodically updated. 
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4. Information and Communications 
For an organization to run and control its operations, it must have relevant, 
reliable information, both financial and nonfinancial, relating to external as well as 
internal events. The organization should also have appropriate channels of 
communication. 
a. Information 
(1) Information from internal and external sources should be 
obtained and provided to management as a part of the organization’s reporting on 
operational performance relative to established objectives.  
(2) Pertinent information should be identified, captured, and 
distributed to the right people in sufficient detail, in the right form, and at the appropriate 
time to enable them to carry out their duties and responsibilities efficiently and 
effectively. Consider the following: 
• Managers receive analytical information that helps them 
identify specific actions that need to be taken. 
• Information is provided at the right level of detail for 
different levels of management. 
• Program managers receive both operational and financial 
information to help them determine whether they are 
meeting the strategic and annual performance plans and 
meeting the organization’s goals for accountability of 
resources. 
• Operational information is provided to managers so that 
they may determine whether their programs comply with 
applicable laws and regulations. 
• The appropriate financial and budgetary information is 
provided for both internal and external financial reporting. 
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b. Communications 
(1) Management should ensure that effective internal 
communications occur. Consider the following: 
• Top management provides a clear message throughout the 
organization that internal control responsibilities are 
important and must be taken seriously. 
• Employees’ specific duties are clearly communicated to 
them, and they understand the relevant aspects of internal 
control, how their role fits into it, and how their work 
relates to the work of others. 
• Acceptable behavior versus unacceptable behavior and the 
consequences of improper conduct are clearly 
communicated to all employees. 
• Personnel have a means of communicating information 
upstream within the organization through someone other 
than a direct supervisor, and there is a genuine willingness 
to listen on the part of management. 
• Mechanisms exist to allow the easy flow of information 
down, across, and up the organization, and easy 
communications exist between functional activities, such as 
between procurement activities and production activities. 
• Employees indicate that informal or separate lines of 
communications exist, which serve as a fail-safe control for 
normal communications avenues. 
• Personnel understand that there will be no reprisals for 
reporting adverse information, improper conduct, or 
circumvention of internal control activities. 
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• Mechanisms are in place for employees to recommend 
improvements in operations, and management 
acknowledges good employee suggestions with cash 
awards or other meaningful recognition. 
• Management communicates frequently with internal 
oversight groups, such as senior management councils, and 
keeps them informed of performance, risks, major 
initiatives, and any other significant events. 
(2) Management should ensure that effective external 
communications occur with groups that can have a serious impact on programs, projects, 
operations, and other activities, including budgeting and financing. Consider the 
following: 
• Open and effective communications channels have been 
established with customers, suppliers, contractors, 
consultants, and other groups that can provide significant 
input on quality and design of the organization’s products 
and services. 
• All outside parties dealing with the organization are clearly 
informed of the organization’s ethical standards and  
understand that improper actions, such as improper billings, 
kickbacks, or other improper payments, will not be 
tolerated. 
• Communications from external parties, such as other 
governmental agencies, local governments, and other 
related third parties, are encouraged since those 
communications can be a source of information on how 
well internal control is functioning. 
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• Management makes certain that the advice and 
recommendations of auditors and evaluators are fully 
considered and that actions are implemented to correct any 
problems or weaknesses they identify. 
c. Forms and Means of Communications 
(1) The organization should employ various forms and means 
of communicating important information with employees and others. Consider the 
following: 
• Management uses effective communications methods, 
which may include policy and procedures manuals, 
management directives, memoranda, bulletin-board notices, 
internet and intranet web pages, videotaped messages, e-
mail, and speeches. 
• Two of the most powerful forms of communications used 
by management are the positive actions it takes in dealing 
with personnel throughout the organization and its 
demonstrated support of internal control. 
(2) The organization should manage, develop, and revise its 
information systems in an effort to continually improve the usefulness and reliability of 
its communication of information. Consider the following: 
• Management continually monitors the quality of 
information captured, maintained, and communicated as 
measured by such factors as appropriateness of content, 
timeliness, accuracy, and accessibility. 
5. Monitoring 
Internal control monitoring should assess the quality of performance over time 
and ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.  
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a. Ongoing Monitoring 
(1) Management should have a strategy to ensure that ongoing 
monitoring is effective and will trigger separate evaluations where problems are 
identified. Consider the following: 
• Management’s strategy provides for routine feedback and 
monitoring of performance and control objectives. 
• The monitoring strategy includes methods emphasizing to 
program and operational mangers that they have 
responsibility for internal control and that they should 
monitor the effectiveness of control activities as a part of 
their regular duties. 
• The monitoring strategy includes identification of critical 
operational and mission support systems that need special 
review and evaluation. 
• The strategy includes a plan for periodic evaluation of 
control activities for critical operational and mission 
support systems. 
(2) In the process of carrying out their regular activities, 
organization personnel should obtain information about whether internal control is 
functioning properly. Consider the following: 
• Operating reports are integrated or reconciled with 
financial and budgetary reporting system data and are used 
to manage operations on an ongoing basis. Management is 
aware of inaccuracies or exceptions that could indicate 
internal control problems. 
• Operating management compares production or other 
operating information obtained in the course of its daily 
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activities to system-generated information and follows up 
on any inaccuracies or other problems that might be found. 
• Operating personnel are required to sign off on the 
accuracy of their unit’s financial statements and are held 
accountable if errors are discovered. 
(3) Communications from external parties should corroborate 
internally-generated data or indicate problems with internal control. Consider the 
following: 
• Management recognizes that customer payment for 
invoices help to corroborate billing data, while customer 
complaints indicate that deficiencies may exist; and these 
deficiencies are then investigated to determine the 
underlying causes. 
• Communications from vendors and monthly statements of 
accounts payable are used as control-monitoring 
techniques. 
• Supplier complaints about any unfair practices by 
organization purchasing agents are investigated. 
• Control activities that should have prevented or detected 
any problems that arose, but did not function properly, are 
reassessed. 
(4) Data recorded by information and financial systems should 
be periodically compared with physical assets, and discrepancies should be examined. 
Consider the following: 
• Inventory levels of materials, supplies, and other assets are 
checked regularly; differences between recorded and actual 
amounts are corrected; and the reasons for the 
discrepancies are resolved. 
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• The frequency of the comparison should be a function of 
the vulnerability of the asset. 
• Custodial accountability for assets and resources is 
assigned to responsible individuals. 
(5) Meetings with employees should be used to provide 
management with feedback on whether or not internal control is effective. Consider the 
following: 
• Relevant issues, information, and feedback concerning 
internal control that arose at training seminars, planning 
sessions, and other meetings are captured and used by 
management to address problems or strengthen the internal 
control structure. 
• Employee suggestions on internal control are considered 
and acted upon as appropriate. 
• Management encourages employees to identify internal 
control weaknesses and report them to the next supervisory 
level. 
(6) Employees should regularly be asked to state explicitly 
whether they comply with the organization’s code of conduct. Consider the following: 
• Personnel periodically acknowledge compliance with the 
code of conduct. 
• Signatures are required to document performance of critical 
internal control functions, such as reconciliations. 
b. Separate Evaluations 
(1) The scope and frequency of separate evaluations of internal 
control should be appropriate for the organization. Consider the following: 
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• Consideration is given to the risk assessment results and the 
effectiveness of ongoing monitoring when determining the 
scope and frequency of separate evaluations. 
• Separate evaluations are often prompted by events such as 
major changes in management plans or strategies, major 
expansion or downsizing, significant changes in operations 
or processing of financial or budgetary information, or by 
decision of the oversight MoD agencies. 
• Separate evaluations usually are conducted by external 
auditors, but can be conducted by personnel with the 
required skills from the evaluated organization. 
(2) The methodology for evaluating the organization’s internal 
control should be logical and appropriate. Consider the following: 
• The methodology used may include self-assessments using 
checklists, questionnaires, or other such tools. 
• The separate evaluations may include a review of the 
control design and direct testing of the internal control 
activities. 
• In organizations where large amounts of data are processed 
by the information and financial systems, separate 
evaluation methodology employs computer-assisted audit 
techniques to identify indicators of inefficiencies, waste, or 
abuse. 
• The evaluation team develops a plan for the evaluation 
process to ensure a coordinated effort. 
• If the evaluation process is conducted by the organization’s 
employees, it is managed by an executive with the requisite 
authority, capability, and experience. 
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• The evaluation team gains a sufficient understanding of the 
organization’s missions, goals, and objectives and its 
operations and activities. 
• The evaluation team analyzes the results of the evaluation 
against established criteria. 
• The evaluation process is properly documented. 
(3) Deficiencies found during separate evaluations should be 
promptly resolved. Consider the following: 
• Deficiencies are promptly communicated to the individual 
responsible for the function and also to at least one level of 
management above that individual. 
• Serious deficiencies and internal control problems are 
promptly reported to top management. 
c. Audit Resolution 
(1) The organization should have a mechanism to ensure the 
prompt resolution of findings from Control and Oversight Department audits and other 
reviews. Consider the following: 
• Management determines the proper actions to take in 
response to findings and recommendations. 
• Corrective action is taken or improvements made within 
established time frames to resolve the matters brought to 
management’s attention. 
• Management considers consultations with auditors and 
reviewers when they are believed to be helpful in the audit 
resolution process. 
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(2) Organizational management should be responsive to the 
findings and recommendations of audits and other reviews aimed at strengthening 
internal control. Consider the following: 
• Executives with the proper authority evaluate the findings 
and recommendations and decide upon the appropriate 
actions to take to correct or improve control. 
• There is follow-up on desired internal control actions to 
verify implementation. 
(3) The organization should take appropriate follow-up actions 
with regard to findings and recommendations of audits and other reviews. Consider the 
following: 
• Problems with particular transactions or events are 
corrected promptly. 
• The underlying causes giving rise to the findings or 
recommendations are investigated by management. 
• Actions are decided upon to correct the situation or take 
advantage of the opportunity for improvements. 
• Management and auditors follow up on audit and review 
findings, recommendations, and the actions decided upon 
to ensure that those actions are taken. 
• Top management is kept informed through periodic reports 
on the status of audit and review resolution so that it can 
ensure the quality and timeliness of individual resolution 
decisions. 
E. PROCUREMENT FRAUD DICTIONARY 
A procurement fraud dictionary is an effective tool. However, it does not include 
all possible fraud schemes and must be updated continuously. This dictionary is based on 
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materials from the following websites: U.S. Department of Defense Office of the 
Inspector General (http://www.dodig.mil/Inspections/APO/fraud/) and the U.S. 
Department of Justice National Procurement Fraud Task Force 
(http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/npftf).  
1. Rigged Specifications 
Scheme: The requesting organization, in developing specifications, tailors them to 
meet the qualifications of one particular company, supplier, or product. This applies 
mostly to procurement of special equipment and fixtures. Military unit’s managers 
involved in such a scheme could be seeking bribes or illegal gratuities. 
Detection: Compare specifications established for a particular procurement with 
the contractor’s description of its product or service. Nearly identical matches would 
indicate the possibility of rigged specifications. 
Other indicators of rigged specifications include receipt of only one bid, one bid 
significantly lower than others, and sole source procurement. 
2. Collusive Bidding 
Scheme: A group of companies with the capability of providing the same goods 
or services conspire to exchange bid information on contract solicitations and to take 
turns at submitting the low bid. Such action may be carried out in collusion with 
procuring managers and also involve bribery or illegal gratuities. 
Detection: Examine contract solicitation files for a small number of companies 
doing similar work on what appears to be a rotating basis. Fairly wide disparity between 
winning and losing bids, unsuccessful bidders who become subcontractors after contract 
award, and bids that are very close on nonstandard items with no suggested retail price 
should be investigated. Be suspicious of possible fraudulent activity if competing 
contractors regularly socialize or contractors and military unit’s procurement personnel 
socialize. 
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3. Failure to Meet Specifications 
Scheme: A contractor, in order to increase profits, provides goods or services that 
do not comply with contract specifications in quantity or quality. For example, a 
contractor uses one coat of paint rather than two or pours six inches of aggregate on road 
surfaces instead of nine. Qualitative noncompliance with contract specifications includes 
using inferior or substitute materials. 
Detection: Obtain and review inspection reports to determine whether the work 
performed and materials used in a project were inspected and considered acceptable. A 
lack of inspection indicates potential problems in meeting contract specifications. 
4. False Invoices 
Scheme: Where contracts provide for the continual supply of merchandise over a 
period of time, invoices may be inflated or submitted for goods not delivered. This 
situation is particularly applicable to open-ended purchase agreements. 
Detection: Account for purchases through comparison of physical inventory with 
inventory purchases recorded in the organization’s accounting records. 
5. Duplicate Contract Payments 
Scheme: The contractor submits copies of the same invoice for payment or 
submits more than one original invoice for the same goods or services (most often small 
purchases).  This tactic may be accomplished through collusion between the contractor 
and the requesting military unit’s manager. 
Detection: Review payment documents for a specific time period, checking for 
same payee, amounts paid, and items purchased. Be especially alert to payments 
supported by photocopies of invoices rather than originals. Unusually large quantities of 
a single item purchased over a short period of time may indicate the possibility of 
duplicate payments. 
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6. Change Orders Abuse 
Scheme: A company bidding on a contract, in collusion with personnel from the 
requesting organization, submits a low bid to ensure receiving the contract award. 
However, the company has been assured that change orders will be issued during the life 
of the contract to more than compensate for the low bid. After the contract is awarded, 
the contractor and the military unit responsible official share the excessive 
reimbursements. 
Detection: Analyze contract change orders for the addition of new items and for 
significant increases in scope, quantities, and price of existing contract items. 
7. Excessive Small Purchases of Tools, Supplies, etc. 
Scheme: Items are purchased and subsequently diverted for personal use. This 
includes items which are not required or quantities purchased in excess of requirements.  
Detection: Obtain a listing of small purchases made over a specified period of 
time and rearrange the list by name of purchaser and organizational unit. 
8. Split Purchases 
Scheme: Procurement is split into two or more purchase orders to avoid the 
scrutiny required for larger-dollar-value contracts. Splitting the requirement may waste 
funds by losing the economic advantage of volume purchasing. Favoritism or other forms 
of fraud are easier to conceal when small purchase methods are used. 
Detection: Scrutinize invoices and supporting documentation for evidence. Look 
for identical items that were purchased in different quantities simultaneously or within a 
short period of time. Also, the project could be split by the type of work (material and 
labor for the same project paid separately). 
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9. Phantom Contractors 
Scheme: An invoice(s) from a nonexistent company is submitted for payment. 
This fraud could be perpetrated by accounting personnel or someone responsible for 
administration of the project. 
Detection: Scrutinize invoices and supporting documentation. Look for oddly-
named vendors and strange addresses or telephone numbers. Be alert to payments 
supported by photocopies of invoices.  
10. Commingling of Contracts 
Scheme: A company is awarded separate contracts for various efforts, e.g., 
electrical contracts, painting contracts, flooring contracts, etc. Each contract allows 
charges for services or items used in the other contracts as well. Through collusion, the 
contractor can bill for the same work or supplies on each of the contracts. A similar 
scheme involves mixing of inventories to prevent identification of purchase with special 
funds. For example, paint purchased for government-owned quarters may be used for 
painting an individual’s home. Items purchased with office supply funds may be used for 
a worker’s personal use.. 
11. Abnormal Increase in Consumption of Fuel or Automotive-Supply 
Items 
Scheme 1: Abnormally high consumption of fuel or common supply items such as 
automotive parts, tools, and individual equipment indicates the items could have been 
diverted for personal use or resale.  
Scheme 2: Maintenance personnel may charge unnecessary parts to vehicle 
maintenance and divert these parts for personal use or gain. For example, vehicle 
maintenance records identify fourteen tire replacements in 8,148 miles, five new batteries 
in 100 miles, and seven tune-ups in 8,000 miles. 
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Scheme 3: Government funds are used for replacement parts in new vehicles. If 
vehicle records show that parts procured with government funds are being used in new 
vehicles, there is a possibility that the parts are being sold for personal gain. 
12. Overstatement of Shipment Weights 
Suppliers may be defrauding the military unit by artificially inflating the weight 
of a shipment. They could use the following methods to “bump” or increase the true 
weight of a shipment:  
• Body bumping: A lightweight driver sits in the van when getting the tare 
weight and a heavier driver gets the gross weight of the van.  
• Fuel Bumping: Getting the tare weight with less than a full tank of gas and 
the gross weight with a full tank.  
• Packing/Equipment Bumping: Getting the tare weight without the required 
packing and equipment (blankets, ladders, snow chains, etc.) and getting 
the gross weight with the equipment included could result in a net increase 
of several hundred pounds. 
13. Large Year-End Purchases for Nonspecific Items 
Employees may obligate all year-end funds to a local vendor to establish a credit 
balance account. Future purchases are then made against this account. 
F. SUMMARY OF GUIDELINES 
FRAUD INDICATOR GUIDELINES 
Program component Activities 
Fraud Detection Detect if fraud is possible by evaluating different 
indicators: situational, accounting related, documentary, and 
behavioral.  
Follow-up Detection If a fraud investigative unit identifies a “red flag” event, it 
 109
Procedures should extend auditing procedures and immediately inform the 
Control and Oversight Department of MoD. 
Fraud Resolution If fraud is identified, certain actions must be taken by 
commander. These include criminal referral to fraudsters, 
disciplinary, and civil actions as well as internal control 
remediation. 
Table 4.   Fraud Indicator Guidelines 
GUIDELINES FOR A BASIC ANTI-FRAUD PROGRAM 
Basic Fraud Prevention 
Program 
• Create a fraud task force  
• Establish whistle-blower program  
• Institute an anti-fraud hotline 
• Design and deliver a fraud awareness training program.  
Table 5.   Guidelines for a Basic Anti-fraud Program  
GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING AN ADVANCED ANTI-FRAUD 
INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM 
The Control Environment • Establish appropriate “tone at the top,” atmosphere of 
integrity, and ethical values 
• Develop a policy and a methodology to investigate 
potential occurrences of fraud 
• Develop an appropriate management philosophy and 
operating style 
• Correct organizational structure to achieve transparency 
and effective internal control  
• Assign proper authority and responsibility 
 
Risk Assessment • Establish entity-wide and activity-level objectives 
• Identify risks and conduct analysis 
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• Involve appropriate personnel in the risk assessment 
process 
  
Control Activities • Conduct regular reviews at the functional or activity level 
• Establish physical control over valuable and sensitive 
assets 
• Have a proper segregation of duties 





• Establish proper channels of communication 
• Establish policies for reporting of fraudulent activity 
Monitoring • Provide a periodic internal evaluation of anti-fraud 
controls. 
• Use independent evaluations of fraud prevention programs 
by Control and Oversight Department of MoD. 
 
Table 6.   Guidelines for Establishing an Advanced Anti-fraud Internal Control 
Program  
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The primary purpose of this project was to review the best practices of American 
organizations in the areas of internal control and fraud prevention and to provide 
guidelines for fraud detection and fraud deterrence for commanders. The Commander’s 
(Executive Officer’s) Guide for Detecting and Deterring Procurement Fraud in a 
Military Unit (or Organization) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine incorporates several 
tools from fraud prevention documents such as the Office of Management and Budget’s 
Circular A-123 of 1981, the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA), 
COSO’s Internal Control—Integrated Framework, the GAO’s “Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government,” and others. This research found that entities can 
take several actions to prevent fraud by evaluating indicators of fraudulent activity, 
establishing and developing anti-fraud processes and controls, and creating a culture of 
honesty and high ethical behavior. 
Organizationally, this MBA project is comprised of six chapters. Chapter I 
provided an introduction, outlining the background, purpose of the project, research 
objectives and methods, and the organization of this project. Chapter II discussed internal 
control and fraud management found in the literature review. Chapter III identified the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces as a unique and dynamic control environment in the process of 
transformation. Chapter IV explored the complex, interrelated mix of managerial issues 
that will confront the Ukrainian military as its internal control system undergoes change, 
such as organizational culture, leadership, and execution challenges. Finally, Chapter V 
provided guidelines for fraud detection and fraud deterrence and for internal control to 
assist commanders in establishing a wide-range effective internal control system. 
The research methodology used for this project consisted of collecting relevant 
data from a variety of sources for analysis. Books, instructions, internet sites, and journal 
articles were reviewed to create a comprehensive outline of the methods, policies, and 
practices used in the United States to fight fraud. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
The situation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as throughout the Ukraine, 
demands that an appropriate and effective internal control system be put in place. The 
Ukrainian government has approved a long-term strategy to create an internal control 
system based on COSO standards. A sound internal control system will effectively 
uphold the corporate vision, communicate strategies throughout the organization, and link 
these strategies with the objectives at all levels. The objectives of an effective internal 
control system should do more than merely protect an organization from fraud. COSO’s 
landmark report on internal control suggests three main goals: efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations, accuracy of financial reporting, and compliance with laws 
and regulations.  
Governmental internal control, as a system, must be built on laws and legislation. 
Currently Ukraine is lacking such legislation. Incorporating and implementing an 
American-style internal control system, while also considering the characteristics and 
philosophy of the Ukrainian armed forces, will be a challenging task.  
Not only is the implementation of an internal control system a requirement of 
Ukrainian law, but it is also a necessary tool for educating managers and other 
stakeholders. Leaders and key personnel should understand the purpose and vision of 
internal control. To increase general awareness about internal control issues, simple but 
highly visible short-term benefits such as those suggested in the Commander’s Guide are 
vital.  The author believes that the guide will prove to be a useful instrument for 
commanders in Ukrainian government organizations.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Commander’s Guide has a limited number of applications--the procurement 
functions of a military organization. Nevertheless, it suggests several generally applicable 
measures against fraud, such as hotlines, an analysis of fraud perpetrators’ reasons for 
committing fraud, and the creation of an atmosphere of financial integrity. Follow-on  
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development of this project may include the creation of similar guides for other 
categories of fraud and the incorporation of anti-fraud programs into a wide-ranging 
internal control system.  
Effective internal control for the Ukrainian Armed Forces remains a major goal. 
The suggested Commander’s Guide contains guidelines that can be incorporated into an 
internal control system at the operational or strategic level of the Ukrainian government. 
Another possibility for using the guide is in testing the applicability of American models 
to the Ukrainian government. If results of an implementation at the organizational level 
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1 Actual amount is UAH 2.96 million 
2 Actual amount is UAH 965.9 thousand 
3 Any research which is used to answer a specific question, determine why 
something failed or succeeded, solve a specific, pragmatic problem, or to gain better 
understanding (JRS Consulting glossary). 
4 According to definitions from the interdisciplinary systems theory, it is a system 
that interacts with an environment (surrounding entities, systems, etc) in opposition to a 
closed, self-sufficient system. Because fraudulent activity inputs from the environment 
are crucial and modify behavior (opportunity, motivation), the system must be open. 
5 The OMB website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/) defines 
circulars as “instructions or information issued by OMB to Federal agencies. These are 
expected to have a continuing effect of two years or more.” 
6 FMFIA, an abbreviation for Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982, 
required that each federal agency establish systems of internal administrative controls and 
accounting in compliance with standards of the comptroller general. It also requires the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) to issue standards for internal control in government. 
7 The last revision of the above-mentioned standards is dated by November 1999. 
It became widely known throughout the government as the “Green Book.” Since 1983 
standards were updated because “changes in information technology, emerging issues 
involving human capital management, and requirements of recent financial management-
related legislation have prompted renewed focus on internal control”(GAO-01-1008G, 
2001 p.1). Actually the “Green Book” is successful adaptation and simplification for 
governmental needs theoretical concepts from COSO ICIF. 
8 Note that information systems should be the part of a communication system. 
Communication is a broader concept than just informational exchange. COSO agrees that 
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all personnel “need to receive a clear message from top management that internal control 
responsibilities must be taken seriously” or “understand the relevant aspects of the 
internal control system, how they work and his or her role and responsibility in the 
system” (ICIF, p.63). However, “understanding” or communication is different from just 
receiving information. For detailed discussion about communication see, for example, 
Jim Suchan, “The Effect of Language and Metaphor on Managerial Communication 
Thinking and Action.” 
9 This is a simplification; the real structure is much more complex (Figure 1), 
including support command, special forces, joint rapid-reaction forces, etc., but these 
entities are not concerned with issues surrounding centralized financial control. 
10 See Preamble section about differences in understanding of internal control. 
11 Land forces have three territorial control and oversight directorates down the 
structure with the same level of responsibility as the service level. 
12 This number is subject to regular changes because of structural reformations in 
the armed forces. 
13 Calculated by author from different sources related to the organizational 
strength of control and oversight services during his service as a chief of general-policy 
division in the Department of Finance and accurate for 2006–2007. 
14 Calculated salary and per diem expenditures only. For conversion of hrivnas in 
dollars, a rate of 8UAH per 1USD was used. 
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